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ARTICLE
Applying Daubert to Flaubert
Standards for Admissibility of Testimony
of Writing Experts
Heidi K. Brown*
"One day I shall explode like an artillery shell and
all my bits will be found on the writing table'1
-Gustave Flaubert
Experts routinely play a vital role in the resolution of legal disputes
involving a wide range of subject matter, from "hard science" topics like
blood-spatter analysis,2 to "soft science" matters such as damages quantifi-
cation,3 to art authentication, 4 to gang tattoos, 5 to the distinct skills of
Brazilian "gaucho chefs" known as "churrasqueiros" 6 Because many legal
cases turn on the meaning, context, impact, or integrity of a writing,
numerous litigants have proffered writing experts to render opinions on a
variety of issues. These include (1) the usage of language, phrasing, or
typography in a particular industry, trade, or profession; (2) the
substantive or technical quality of a piece of writing; (3) the methodology
of drafting certain document genres; (4) the cultural context of writings;
and (5) comparisons of the content and style of two writings. Often, such
experts are qualified based on professional roles as professors of creative
writing, legal writing, English, literature, linguistics, or rhetoric.
* Associate Professor of Law, Director of Legal Writing, Brooklyn Law School. Professor Brown thanks Brooklyn Law School
for its summer research stipend support. She further thanks her research assistant, Jessica Laredo, her colleagues, Professors
Loreen Peritz, Heidi Gilchrist, Jodi Balsam, and Lawrence M. Solan, and the editorial team of Legal Communication and
Rhetoric: JALWD for their valuable input.
1 Attributed to Gustave Flaubert. See https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/129938-one-day-i-shall-explode-like-an-artillery-
shell-and.
2 See, e.g., Rasmussen v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 1088(BMC), 2011 WL 744522, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2011).
3 See, e.g., Hughes v. The Ester C Co., 317 ER.D. 333, 343 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
4 See, e.g., Fletcher v. Doig, 196 E Supp. 3d 817, 824 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 447 E App'x 752 (8th Cir. 2011).
6 See e.g., Iogo de Chao (Holdings) Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 769 E3d 1127, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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In fact, lawyers have retained legal writing professors and practi-
tioners to serve as experts to analyze different types of documents, not all
necessarily legal documents but which still have legal effect. A legal
writing expert engaged for the first time might wonder, What exactly is the
standard for admissibility of expert testimony regarding a writing? This
article provides guidance regarding that standard so that lawyers 7 and
writing experts can be better prepared to anticipate evidentiary challenges
and avoid the dreaded phone call to the client. It is never pleasant to
report that, after the client's financial outlay and the lawyer's and an
expert's substantial exertion of labor, the court granted opposing counsel's
motion in limine to exclude the expert from testifying at trial.
Part I of this article summarizes the current criteria for admissibility
of expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (FRE 702) and the
seminal case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.8 and its
progeny. Part II surveys case law in which litigants have proffered experts
in a variety of writing milieus to assist the trier-of-fact. This section is
designed to give new legal writing experts a flavor of different contexts in
which lawyers engage writing experts and to flag possible evidentiary
pitfalls that may arise therein. Part III offers tangible guidance for legal
writing experts (and the counsel who hire them) to develop expert
opinions, reports, and testimony in a way that will appropriately satisfy the
admissibility criteria of FRE 702 and Daubert. Legal writing experts can
assist the trier-of-fact and the legal process by applying the concrete and
reliable legal writing standards and analytical methodologies that are well-
established in legal academia and law practice.
I. Federal Evidentiary Standards Regarding Expert
Testimony
In a 1935 article, Lloyd Rosenthal, a graduate of Cornell Law School
and a research assistant for the Law Revision Commission of the State of
New York, analyzed the history of the development of expert testimony.
He acknowledged that "the effective administration of justice requires aid
7 See Lyle Griffin Warshauer & Michael J. Warshauer, Prepping Your Expert, TRIAL, Sept. 2012, 15 ("Expert witnesses can be
blindsided when their opinions are attacked in court. Advising them about the rigors of litigation is essential-it can be the
difference between winning and losing your case' "If a Daubert challenge is to be defeated, it is up to the trial attorney to
advise the expert about the decision. You must not only provide the expert with the relevant facts and records, but also
explain how his or her opinion may be attacked in litigation'); W. William Hodes, Navigating Some Deep and Troubled
Jurisprudential Waters: Lawyer-Expert Witnesses and the Twin Dangers of Disguised Testimony and Disguised Advocacy, 6
ST. MARY'S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 180, 183 (2016) (commenting on the problems with expert witnesses "exceeding the
boundaries of proper expert testimony" and the reality that "too often,... these excesses are encouraged by the lawyers
presenting the testimony of the experts").
8 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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from other branches of learning and science" 9 He cited a judge's notation
in a 1553 case pending at the Court of Common Bench in the United
Kingdom which stated that "we do not despise all sciences but our own,
but we approve of them, and encourage them as things worthy of
commendation."" The 1553 case specifically referred to the helpfulness of
experts in written language. In particular, it referenced individuals skilled
in the study of Latin to assist the court which was "in doubt about the
meaning" of a word."
Four hundred and forty years later, in 1993, the United States
Supreme Court issued a decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1 2 establishing an evolved modern standard
governing the admissibility of expert-witness testimony at trial. Daubert
involved a lawsuit by infants and their guardians ad litem against a phar-
maceutical company. They sought to recover for limb-reduction birth
defects allegedly resulting from their mothers' ingestion of an anti-nausea
drug during pregnancy. The trial court had granted summary judgment in
favor of the drug company based, in part, on an affidavit from the
company's expert. The expert had opined that the drug posed no risk
factor for human birth defects. 3 In response to the affidavit, the plaintiffs
proffered testimony of eight other "well-credentialed experts:" These
experts linked the drug to birth defects by relying "on animal studies,
chemical structure analyses, and the unpublished 'reanalysis' of... human
statistical studies.1 4 The trial court rejected the plaintiffs' experts, finding
that their testimony failed to satisfy the "general acceptance" standard for
admissibility of expert opinions. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit agreed, relying on the 1923 case of Frye v. United States.1 5 Under
Frye, expert opinion based on a scientific technique was inadmissible
unless the technique was "generally accepted" as reliable in the relevant
scientific community.
1 6
As the Daubert Court noted, however, Congress had enacted the
Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. The rules represented the culmination
of a long journey initially launched from a 1938 recommendation by
former Attorney General William D. Mitchell. Mitchell had advocated for
9 Lloyd L. Rosenthal, The Development of the Use of Expert Testimony, 2 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 403, 405 (1935).
10 Id. (quoting Saunders, J., in Buckley v. Rice, I Plowd. 125 (1554)).
11 Rosenthal, supra note 9, at 408.
12 509 U.S. at 582.
13 Id. at 583.
14 Id. at 579.
15 Id. at 584 (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
16 Id.
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the appointment of an advisory committee to draft a new set of
evidentiary rules. 17 The January 2, 1975, version of FRE 702 stated, "If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise"1 8
The Daubert Court held that FRE 702 directly addressed the admissibility
of expert testimony and thus superseded the Frye "general acceptance"
standard.19 The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision
(which had been based on Frye) and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
20
Building on the threshold consideration of a witness's qualifications to
testify as an expert, the Daubert Court provided a new set of factors for
courts to use in determining whether opinion testimony "will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue" as
required in FRE 702. These factors include (1) whether the expert's theory
or technique has been tested,21 (2) whether the theory or technique has
been subjected to peer review and publication, 22 (3) the technique's
"known or potential rate of error" and "the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling the technique's operation" 23 and (4) the degree of
acceptance of the theory or technique within the scientific community. 24
The Court was careful to assert that "[m]any factors will bear on the
inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test."25
Thus, the Court emphasized that this type of evaluation should be
"flexible ' 26 and attentive to "principles and methodology, not on the
conclusions that they generate."27 The Court reiterated that, to be
admissible, expert testimony must be both reliable and relevant. 28
In 1999, the Supreme Court revisited the standard for admissibility of
expert testimony in Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael.29 Kumho
Tire involved a products-liability action brought by a vehicle driver against
a tire manufacturer and a distributor. The driver sued for damages related
to injuries he sustained when a tire on his vehicle blew out and the car
17 Josh Camson, History of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 21 Id. at 592.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, https://apps.americanbar.org/ 22 Id. at 593.
litigation/litigationnews/trial skills/061710-trial-evidence-
federal-rules-of-evidence-history.html (last visited Mar. 12, 23 Id. at 594.
2018). 24 Id.
18 Murrell v. Cargill Meat Logistics Solutions, Inc., No. 25 Id. at 593.
7:05-CV-80 (CDL), 2007 WL 7629012, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Feb.
8, 2007).
27 Id. at 595.
19 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
20 Id. at 598. 28 Id. at 597.
29 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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flipped over.30 The Kumho Tire Court explained that, while the Daubert
Court had focused on admissibility of scientific expert testimony,31 the
same principles should apply to all expert testimony.3 2 The Court
emphasized that the judiciary's "gatekeeping function" with regard to
experts is "to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon
professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the
same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert
in the relevant field "'33 The Court reasserted the importance of judges
having "leeway" and "latitude" when measuring the reliability of a
particular expert's opinions.3 4
In 2000, Congress amended FRE 702 to incorporate the factors and
principles identified in Daubert and Kumho Tire, settling on language that
was modified slightly-in style only-in the 2011 Amendments. 15 The
current version of FRE 702 states,
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise
if:
* the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue;
* the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts
of the case.
Thus, when evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony, federal
courts today (and state courts that have adopted the Daubert standard)3 6
are tasked with conducting a three-part analysis, assessing (1) the expert's
qualifications, (2) the reliability of the expert's methodology and
underlying data, and (3) the relevance of the expert's opinions to the case
at hand (i.e., the helpfulness-to-the-trier-of-fact factor).3 7 Notably, the
Advisory Committee Notes in the 2000 Amendments to FRE 702 state
30 Id.
31 Id. at 141.
32 Id. at 147.
33 Id. at 152.
34 Id.
35 FED. R. EVID. 702, advisory committee's notes to 2011 amendment.
36 For a helpful chart listing which states use the Frye standard and which have adopted the Daubert standard, see
https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/daubert-v- frye-a-state-by-state-comparison/.
37 Stanacard, LLC v. Rubard LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5176 (CM), 2016 WL 6820741, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2016).
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that "rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule"3 8
Nonetheless, federal courts will exclude expert testimony that is "specu-
lative or conjectural."39
Litigants periodically attempt to exclude an opponent's expert from
trial if the witness intends to render opinions that bear on the ultimate
issue in the case. They argue that such evidence "invades the province" of
the trier-of-fact. 40 FRE 704(a) clarifies that an expert opinion "is not objec-
tionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue. 41 Instead, the rule is
that though an expert "may opine on an issue of fact within the [trier of
fact's] province, he may not give testimony stating ultimate legal
conclusions based on those facts. 42 As stated in Burrell v. Adkins,43 "[a]n
expert's legal conclusion invades the court's province.... Expert testimony
on issues of law, either giving a legal conclusion or discussing the legal
implications of evidence, is inadmissible' 4
4
Courts also have emphasized that admissible expert testimony must
journey "beyond the general experience and common understanding of
laypersons."45 Federal courts acknowledge that experts who opine about
topics or subjects that are well within the average factfinder's scope of
knowledge or experience provide no value to the legal process.46 Courts
recognize the gamble that a factfinder may supplant his or her own good
sense and sound judgment with the expert's assessments "simply because
expert analysis is dressed in a cloak of science and inflated by the degrees
38 FED. R. EVID. 702, advisory committee's notes to 2000 amendment; see also Hilaire v. DeWalt Industrial Tool Co., 54 F.
Supp. 3d 223 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (granting a motion to preclude the testimony of an expert because his proposed testimony was
not reliable); Anthony U. Battista et. al., Reliability at the Gate: To Allow Expert Testimony or Not, A Comprehensive
Overview, 43 THE BRIEF 28, 29, 36 (2014) ("the exclusion of expert testimony still is rare"; "exclusion of expert testimony is
always the last resort for a court"); Peter Durney & Julianne C. Fitzpatrick, Retaining and Disclosing Expert Witnesses: A
Global Perspective, 83 DEF. COUNS. J. 17, 22 (2016) ("Generally, post-Daubert, and despite the now-routine challenges,
rejection of expert testimony for lack of reliability has been the exception rather than the rule:').
39 New York v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 15-CV-1136 (KBF), 2016 WL 4735368, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2016); Bah v. City of
New York, 13-CV-6690 (PKC), 2017 WL 435823, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2017).
40 See, e.g., Cameron v. Teeberry Logistics, LLC, No. 3:12-CV- 181-TCB, 2013 WL 7874709, at *1 (N.D. Ga. May 21, 2013);
Al-Turki v. Robinson, No. 10-CV-02404-WJM-CBS, 2013 WL 603109, at *5 (D. Colo. Feb. 15, 2013).
41 FED. R. EVID. 704(a).
42 United Parcel Serv., 2016 WL 4735368, at *4; see also United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1294 (2d Cir. 1991); Hibbett
Patient Care LLC v. Pharmacists Mut. Ins. Co., No. 16-0231-WS-C, 2017 WL 2062955, at *3 (S.D. Ala. May 12, 2017). For a
helpful discussion of the permissibility of expert testimony about an "ultimate issue;' see Hodes, supra note 7, at 187-88.
43 No. CV01-2679-M, 2007 WL 2771602 (W.D. La. Aug. 17, 2000).
441d. at*l.
45 Disalvatore v. Foretravel, Inc., No. 9:14-CV-150, 2016 WL 3951426, at *9 (E.D. Tex. June 30, 2016).
46 Fast v. Coastal Journeys Unlimited, Inc., No. 6:16-CV-00060-MC, 2016 WL 7331557, at *3 (D. Or. Dec. 16, 2016); see,
e.g., Godfrey v. Iverson, 559 F.3d 569, 573 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that no expert was needed to determine the standard of
care of an athlete who stood by while his bodyguard beat someone); Boucher v. CVS/Pharmacy, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 98, 108
(D.N.H. 2011) (holding that expert testimony "as to whether a cane would have reduced the risk of a fall" was unnecessary,
because the "beneficial effects of a cane are a matter of common knowledge").
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and training of the witness. 47 Rather than exclude the testimony, though,
courts also have stated that cross examination and rebuttal experts
provide sufficient vehicles for managing such a risk.48
Some evidence scholars have noted an "extraordinary undercurrent of
rebellion" by some federal judges who "apply significantly more lenient
standards for expert testimony" than FRE 702 and Daubert permit.49 No
attempt is made here to resolve perceived inconsistencies in federal courts'
application of FRE 702 and Daubert across jurisdictions, nor to propose a
solution for enhancing consistency therein. Instead, the focus here is on
how various courts have addressed the admissibility of writing experts in
particular, to clarify for new writing experts how to appropriately
withstand an opposing counsel's or a court's methodical adherence to the
FRE 702 and Daubert standards as such rules are currently written. With
proper forethought and respect for the purpose of expert testimony,
writing experts can indeed play a helpful role in assisting the trier-of-fact.
The following section describes a variety of types of engagements of
writing experts, to give new experts a sense of how such opinions and
testimony have been used in other cases.
II. Litigants Have Proffered Expert Opinions on
Writings Across a Spectrum of Legal Matters
Against the foregoing backdrop of FRE 702, Daubert, and Kumho Tire,
litigants have proffered experts in writing and written works to render
opinions in a variety of legal matters and capacities. Some writing experts
have provided affidavits, reports, or deposition testimony that assisted in
settling legal matters without the need for trial,5 0 and others have gone the
distance and testified at trial.
47 Fast, 2016 WL 7331557, at *3.
48 Nielsen Audio, Inc. v. Clem, No. 8:15-CV-2435-T-27AAS, 2017 WL 1483353, at *3 (M.D. Fla. April 24, 2017); see also
Battista et al., supra note 38, at 28 ('Although federal courts have great flexibility in their gatekeeping capacity, they would
much rather rely on cross-examination to weed out evidence that might be premised on less than adequate methods than
exclude an expert's opinion in its entirety.").
49 David Bernstein, The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert Revolution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27, 29, 30
(2013); see also David E. Bernstein & Eric G. Lasker, Defending Daubert: Its Time to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 57
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 8 (2015) ("[A] number of courts have simply ignored the Rule 702 amendment...); see also Brian
R. Gallini, To Serve and Protect? Officers as Expert Witnesses in Federal Drug Prosecutions, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 374,
388 (2012) (noting that "circuit courts readily affirm district courts' qualification of law enforcement experts [in federal drug
prosecutions] that do not apply" the Daubert factors, and that "the federal judiciary is largely ignoring the requirements of
Rule 702").
50 Notably, a lawyer might alternatively engage an expert as a non-testifying expert; FRCP 26(a)(2)(A) does not require
litigants to disclose the identity of non-testifying consultants, and such individuals are not required to submit written reports.
Durney & Fitzpatrick, supra note 38, at 19-20.
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A consideration of the role of a "writing expert" in litigation might
prompt one first to assume we are referring to handwriting experts.
Handwriting experts typically have educational qualifications in the study
of forensic document analysis, or professional experience working in
"questioned document" laboratories. They examine human penmanship
to resolve issues of authenticity.5 1 In contrast, the writing experts at issue
here are retained by litigants to delve into the methodology of producing a
written document. These experts might be tasked with analyzing the
concepts, sources, language, vocabulary, and punctuation selected by the
author in the synthesizing, drafting, editing, and revising process. Or such
experts might focus on the end product of the writing process. Litigants
might be disputing a document's substantive or technical quality, the
context of the language therein, its sufficiency in scope, or its clarity.
Alternatively, perhaps these types of experts will compare two writings:
their content, context, structural framework, or style.
In the cases described in the following sections, many writing experts
qualified as such by virtue of their professional roles as professors of
creative writing, legal writing, English, literature, linguistics, or rhetoric.
Others had significant professional or industry experience analyzing cate-
gories of documents such as contracts, police affidavits, white papers,
patent applications, or music lyrics. The following case survey is intended
to inform new writing experts (and lawyers) about the varieties of subject
matter and scope in expert engagements involving writings, but also to
clarify the standard for admissibility of expert testimony about a written
work. In preparing to render expert opinions and ultimately testify at trial,
writing experts must consider matters of reliability of methodology,
relevance, limitations on the ability to opine on the ultimate issues in the
case, and the provision of context beyond the range of knowledge or expe-
rience of the trier-of-fact.
A. Litigants Often Engage Writing Experts to Provide Opinions
on the Grammatical Construction of a Writing
In today's arena of modern written communications, grammatically
challenged Twitter "tweets '5 2 and poorly punctuated Facebook postings
51 See, e.g., In re Lawrence Michael O'Brien, 555 B.R. 771, 775 (D. Kan. 2016) (expert examined signatures on loan
documents); Simone Ling Francini, Expert Handwriting Testimony: Is The Writing Really On The Wall?, 11 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL
& APP. ADVOC. 99, 108 n.78 (2006). For helpful articles about the practice of presenting and cross-examining handwriting
experts in court, see Marcel B. Matley, Using and Cross-Examining Handwriting Experts, 13 PRAC. LITIGATOR 5, 21 (2002);
Thomas W. Vastrick, Forensic Handwriting Comparison Examination in the Courtroom, 54 JUDGES J. 3, 32 (2015). For an
article about the debate over the validity of handwriting experts see Paul Giannelli & Carin Cozza, Forensic Science: Daubert
Challenges to Handwriting Comparisons, 42 No. 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 3, article 9 (2006).
52 See generally, Trump Grammar, Twitter, https://twitter.com/trumpgrammar?lang en; Polly Higgins, Donald Trump's
grammar, syntax errors: Times when the English language took a hit, AMNEWYORK (Mar. 10, 2017), http://www.amny.com/
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are shrugged off by some as unimportant nit-picking. Others might argue
that true expertise in and emphasis on proper grammar are needed now
more than ever. Indeed, courts have recognized the unimpeachable quali-
fications of certain writing experts in the areas of grammar conventions
and language construction. Judges will allow these experts to render
opinions at trial about the meaning of words and punctuation that will
assist the trier-of-fact. Judges will disallow testimony by experts whose
opinions intrude upon the trier-of-fact's ability to read text and construe
and interpret language and typography for themselves.
1. Grammar Experts Who Do Not Provide Insights Beyond the Capability
of the Trier-of-Fact Risk Exclusion Under Daubert and FRE 702
When legal writers are asked to list names of experts in legal writing
and other genres of written work, of course Professor Bryan A. Garner
immediately springs to mind. He is the editor-in-chief of Black's Law
Dictionary and the author of numerous widely used legal writing books
including The Redbook: A Manual on Legal Style. Professor Garner is a
well-known and highly regarded legal writing expert. Despite Professor
Garner's unassailable qualifications as an expert on legal writing, drafting,
editing, and style, a federal court excluded his opinion testimony in a 2013
case entitled, Lind v. International Paper Co. 3
In Lind, a company and several of its terminated employees disputed
the terms of Change in Control (CIC) agreements after a merger.5 4 The
company contended that the employees had received the full amount of
their allocated compensation in accordance with the express language in
the CIC agreements.5 5 Alleging ambiguity in the phrasing of the
agreements, the employees argued that the company owed them addi-
tional bonus payments and incentive awards. The employees designated
Garner as their expert witness. He prepared an expert report opining that
the language of the bonus provision in the CIC agreements was
ambiguous.5 6 He further provided a construction of the terms of the
news/donald- trump-grammar- syntax-errors-times-when-the-english-language- took- a- hit- 1. 124713 17; see also Caitlin
Gibson, The Trump administration has a spelling problem. But how bad is it really? We investigate., WASH. POST (Feb. 15,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2017/02/15/ the-trump-administration-has-a-
spelling- problem-but-how-bad-is-it-really-we-investigate/?utm term .dae7366d5a30; Lee Moran, Donald Trump's Tweet
About GOP's Tailed Obamacare Replacement'Baclfires, HUFFINGTON POST (July 14,2017,5:55 AM EST), http://www.huff-
ingtonpost.com/ entry/donald-trump-failed-obamacare-replacement-tweet us 59687b48e4b0 d6341fe7db82; Carla
Herreria, Merriam- Webster Steps In After Trump Tells America To 'Heel; (Aug. 19. 2017, 7:26 PM EST), http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/entry/merrian-webster-trump-heel-heal us 5998aeeee4b01f6e801ef6fg.
53 Mar. 12, 2014, Order, available in the docket of Lind v. Int'l Paper Co., No. A- 13-CV-249-DAE, 2014 WL 4187128 (W.D.
Tex. Aug. 21, 2014).
54 See Defendants' Opposed Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Plaintiffs' Expert Bryan A. Garner, Lind, No. 1:13-CV-
00249-LY, 2013 WL 11089050, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2013).
55 Id. at *1.
56 Id.
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agreements, based on grammatical rules.5 7 The company filed a motion to
exclude Garner's testimony, asserting that his opinions on ambiguity and
grammatical interpretation represented legal conclusions that were
neither relevant nor reliable.5 8 In its brief in support of the motion, the
company recited the principle that whether a contract term is ambiguous
is a "pure question of law" for the court to decide and therefore outside the
ambit of expert testimony. s9
The company's lawyers further clarified the distinction between
admissible and inadmissible expert testimony concerning interpretation
or construction of a writing. They acknowledged a circumstance in which
an expert could testify about trade usage of terms in an agreement:
[W]hile in some limited situations expert testimony on the issue of
"trade usage" has been allowed after a determination of ambiguity, here,
Garner's opinions are not based on trade usage and not offered to explain
specialized terms.... Garner offers his commentary on the language of
the agreements solely in light of purported grammatical principles,
based not on any experience in the industry but rather on his experience
as an expert on legal writing. "In the absence of specialized trade usage,
expert testimony regarding proper contract interpretation is inad-
missible, as is expert testimony regarding the legal significance of the
contract language' 60
The company insisted that Garner's testimony would not aid the trier-
of-fact, and therefore it fell short of the FRE 702 standard.61
In their opposition brief, the employees conceded that contractual
ambiguity is a question of law within the court's province. 62 Instead, the
employees emphasized that "[w]hen the fact finder interprets an
ambiguous contract, the rules of grammar are to be followed. 63 Therefore,
they argued that Garner's testimony would help the trier-of-fact by giving
context to principles of grammatical construction. To lay the foundation
for his expert testimony, the employees reiterated that Garner is "a well-
recognized legal linguistic expert with special expertise in lexicography,
drafting conventions, linguistics and the usage of the English language
[who] has spent his entire professional life analyzing, writing about, and
teaching drafting, and is nationally recognized as an expert in linguistics,
lexicography, usage, and construction. 64
57 Id. 62 Response to Motion to Exclude Bryan A. Garner, Lind,




60 Id. (internal citations omitted).
64 Id.
61 Id.
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In its reply brief,65 the company pointed out that the employees'
opposition brief cited no cases in which a court permitted testimony by a
grammar expert to help the trier-of-fact interpret phrasing within an
agreement.66
The Texas federal court granted the company's motion to exclude
Garner's testimony.67 The court cited FRE 702, Daubert, and Kumho Tire,
and held that Garner's opinions on ambiguous contract language
constituted legal conclusions. 68 The court reiterated the rules that "[i]nter-
pretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law for courts;' and
"[a] trial court cannot consider expert testimony in making the determi-
nation that the contract is ambiguous. '69 The court acknowledged the
exception allowing expert opinions that provides context for contractual
terms invoking "specialized trade usage:" The scope of Garner's testimony
did not include trade-usage opinions. 70 The court determined that
Garner's opinions based solely on grammatical principles were "inad-
missible as expert testimony regarding the legal significance of the
contract language itself ' 71
Similarly, in Coyote Portable Storage, LLC v. PODS Enterprises, Inc., 72
a litigant designated Professor Ross Guberman as an expert to render
opinions regarding the meaning and interpretation of royalty provisions in
a portable storage facility franchise agreement. 7 Professor Guberman is
an "expert grammarian" and lawyer who has taught legal drafting at the
George Washington University Law School. 74 Professor Guberman
planned to give expert testimony regarding "the grammatical nuances of a
sentence;' "proper use of commas, the correct syntactic interpretation of
the sentence, and the essential rules of contract drafting that compelled
his conclusions."7 5 The franchisee filed a motion in limine to exclude
Professor Guberman from testifying at trial, arguing that "it is the Court's
job alone to interpret and give meaning to the terms of a contract' 76 In
granting the motion to exclude the expert testimony, the Georgia federal
court noted that he was "not testifying about a technical term in the
contract which needs explaining. 77
65 Reply in Support of Defendants' Opposed Motion to 71 Id. at *5.
Exclude the Testimony of Plaintiffs' Expert BryanA. Garner, 72 No. 1:09-CV-1152-AT, 2011 WL 1870593 (N.D. Ga.
Lind, No. 1:13-CV-00249-LY, 2013 WL 11089053 (W.D. Tex. May 16, 2011).
Dec. 27, 2013).
73 Id. at *2.
66 Id.
74 Id. at *4, n.3.
67 Mar. 12, 2014, Order, available in the docket of Lind,
2014 WL 4187128. 75 Id. at *4.
68 Id. at *4. 76 Id.
69 Id. 77 Id. at *5.
70 Id.
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Further, a New York federal court rejected grammar-interpretation
assistance from a writing expert in Sand v. Greenberg.78 In Sand, the
litigants disputed the interpretation of one party's written $525,000 Offer
of Judgment made pursuant to FRCP 68. The civil procedure rule allows a
party to make an offer to permit the court to enter judgment against it on
specified terms. If the opposing party rejects such offer and does not
obtain a more favorable judgment, the offeror is entitled to recover its
post-offer litigation costs. The plaintiff served a Notice of Acceptance of
the offer and filed a Proposed Final Judgment. The original written Offer
of Judgment contained this language: "inclusive of all damages, liquidated
damages and/or interest plus reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and
expenses actually incurred" Upon the filing of the Notice of Acceptance,
the parties disagreed over whether the foregoing language meant that the
dollar amount of the offer included attorneys' fees.7 9
The defendant who made the original Offer of Judgment proffered a
legal writing professor from a Philadelphia law school as an expert to
opine on the interpretation of the attorneys' fees phrasing.8" Rejecting the
expert, the court asserted that it "does not need the assistance of the
expert to interpret this sentence."81 Performing its own grammatical
analysis, the court distinguished between the actual language of the offer,
which included the words "and/or" and "plus;' and possible alternative
phrasing which could have stated the words "inclusive of" followed by a
list of items linked by serial commas.82 The court interpreted the actual
language as limiting the scope of the word "inclusive" to the words that
immediately followed: solely damages, liquidated damages, and interest.83
The court applied grammar rules and dictionary definitions to analyze the
absence of a comma and the presence of the word "plus:" Ultimately, the
court concluded that attorneys' fees constituted a separate item from the
categories of damages included in the offer.84
In contrast, in American Patent Development Corp. v. MovieLink,
LLC,85 a trial judge adjudicating a patent claim considered the expert
78 No. 08-CIV-7840(PAC), 2010 WL 69359 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7,2010).
79 Id. at *1.
80 Id. at *2.
81 Id; see also United States v. Stile, No. 1:11-CR-00185-JAW, 2013 WL 6448594 (D. Maine Dec. 9, 2013) (rejecting a pro se
motion for funds to hire an English- language grammatical expert to analyze the grammar in a statute under which a
defendant was charged; acknowledging that the defendant had a court-appointed lawyer "who possessed a Juris Doctor
degree and who is fully capable of analyzing the grammatical structure").
82. Sand, 2010 WL 69359, at *3.
83 Id.
84 Id. at *3, *4.
85 604 F. Supp. 2d 704 (D. Del. 2009).
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testimony of an English professor who provided opinions regarding "the
function of a comma in English grammar" and its intentional use by
authors of a patent claim.86 Denying opposing counsel's motion to strike
the expert's declaration, the court (without much analysis) held that the
grammar expert was "qualified to testify as to the function of a comma in
English grammar and.., her methods of analysis were sufficiently reliable
for her opinion to be admissible under Rule 702.87
Linguistics88 scholar Professor Lawrence M. Solan helps shed light on
circumstances in which language experts should be regarded as helpful to
the trier-of-fact, even if at first glance, the interpretive activity seems like
it might "usurp the role of the judge or the jury" Professor Solan and his
co-author, Professor Peter Tiersma, explain,
In cases involving complex language about which there is under-
standable disagreement between the parties, linguists can serve a role by
acting as tour guides, walking the judge or jury through the disputed
language, and explaining how the disputed language is an example of
well-studied linguistic phenomena. The linguist's ultimate interpretation
is not very important, and sometimes should not be given at all."
In other words, if experts "act as guides through difficult passages;'
using their expertise "to explain how it is that various interpretations are
available, their testimony is more likely to be accepted by courts than if
they attempt to tell a court what a legal text means" 90
2. Writing Experts Who Explain Terms of Art and the Usage of Grammar
and Phrasing in the Context of a Particular Trade or Industry Should
Withstand Daubert and FRE 702 Scrutiny
A federal district court in Maryland explained the difference between
(1) an expert's focus on telling a trier-of-fact how to construe an
agreement and (2) an expert's effort to place certain language and gram-
matical constructs within the context of a particular trade or industry. The
86 Id. at 708, 711.
87 Id. at 708; see also Central Elec. Co-op. v. U.S. West, Inc., No. Civ. 05-6017-AA, 2007 WL 4322577, at *5 (D. Or. Dec. 4,
2007) (considering the analysis of an "expert in English grammar, discourse analysis and the use of computer-assisted
techniques for vocabulary and grammar analysis" in interpreting a public-utility regulation).
88 Professor Solan writes about the usefulness of linguistics experts at trial, which covers broader territory than the expert
analysis on written works discussed here. For instance, Professor Solan describes experts in dialects, accents, phonetics, and
discourse analysis, to name but a few categories of forensic linguistics. See, e.g., Peter Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan, The
Linguist on the Witness Stand: Forensic Linguistics in American Courts, 78 LANGUAGE 221, 223 (2002) (noting "the presence
of more than one hundred published judicial opinions that deal with linguistic expertise"); Lawrence M. Solan, Linguistic
Experts as Semantic Tour Guides, 5 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 87 (1998) [hereinafter Solan, Linguistic Experts]; Lawrence M.
Solan, Can the Legal System Use Experts on Meaning 66 TENN. L. REV. 1167 (1999) [hereinafter Solan, Legal Systems].
89 Tiersma & Solan, supra note 88, at 234-35.
90 Id. at 234.
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former lies within the province of the trier-of-fact, while the latter brings
information to the table that may be outside the common knowledge and
experience of the factfinder. In 1859, in Day v. Stellman,91 while inter-
preting the text of patents, assignments, and other written instruments,
the court noted,
while the interpretation and construction of all written instruments is for
the court, it nevertheless will bring to its aid the testimony of witnesses
to explain terms of art, and make itself acquainted with the material with
which the contracts deal, and with the circumstances under which they
were made; but neither the testimony of witnesses in general, nor of
professors, experts or mechanics, can be received, to prove to the court,
what is the proper or legal construction of any instrument of writing.
Such evidence is inadmissible. 92
Patents and insurance contracts are areas in which writing experts
should be welcome at trial ifthey enlighten the trier-of-fact to context not
otherwise discernable by a layperson. 3
In 2013, in interpreting language of insurance contracts (a genre of
writing which some courts have recognized as "confusing"94), the
Maryland federal court in Emcor Group, Inc. v. Great American Insurance
Co. 95 recited the trade-usage rule. 96 In Emcor, one party sought to offer
opinion testimony of an expert in fidelity-insurance contracts to explain
the meaning and scope of the policy's coverage language. The court
deemed the proposed expert testimony "hardly illuminating" 97 declaring
that the expert could not opine on how the contracting parties understood
the policies, nor on the construction of the insurance contract, unless a
particular term carried "a peculiar meaning in a trade, business or
profession. 98
Also in the insurance context, however, Professor Susan Chesler of
Arizona State University's Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law was
retained as an expert to opine regarding the applicability of a policy
exclusion in an insurance coverage dispute.9 9 Professor Chesler teaches
91 7 E Cas. 262 (D. Md. 1859).
92 Id. at 263-64.
93 See, e.g, Tiersma & Solan, supra note 88, at 234.
94 Adamson v. Wadley Health Sys., No. 07-1081, 2008 WL 4649084, at *12 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 20, 2008); Quintana v. State Farm
Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., No. 14CV00105 WJ/GBW, 2014 WL 11512633, at -7 (D.N.M. Dec. 4, 2014).
95 No. ELH-12-0142, 2013 WL 1315029 (D. Md. Mar. 27, 2013).
96 Id. at *9 (internal citations omitted).
97 Id. at *22, n.14.
98 Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Legal Method and Writing, Legal Advocacy, Contracts, Contract Drafting
and Negotiating, and Intensive Legal Research and Writing. In the federal
lawsuit, she submitted an expert report containing her "opinion of the
meaning and applicability of that exclusion based on contract interpre-
tation principles generally, and most specifically on the plain meaning of
the language used by the drafter."100 Opposing counsel deposed Professor
Chesler, but the matter ultimately settled before she could testify at trial.101
Opposing counsel did not file a motion in limine to exclude her testimony.
Again, Professor Solan's work offers guidance regarding when an
expert should be permitted to opine regarding "the meaning of texts:' He
refers to the usefulness of experts in parsing "tricky passages-passages
about which the parties argue sensibly in favor of conflicting positions. 1 0 2
He posits that "if a party can give a juror more confidence in the rightness
of her position by converting, at least in part, an intuitive sympathy into a
structured understanding, then the Rules of Evidence say that the party
should be allowed to do so:'103
Further, a specific focus on business usage of language and punc-
tuation rather than mere grammatical construction perhaps tilted the
scale in favor of a tribunal's reliance on testimony from a writing expert in
an ethics inquiry concerning a judicial candidate in Oregon. Professor
Rebekah Hanley, a professor of legal research and writing at the University
of Oregon School of Law, was retained to render expert opinions about
the meaning of a comma in a judicial candidate's biographical statement.
Professor Hanley's expert qualifications stemmed from her legal writing
training, experience, and knowledge. She served in two federal clerkships,
worked in a law firm, taught legal writing for over a decade, authored
numerous publications, and delivered many presentations within the legal
writing academy. She also held the role of Assistant Dean for Career
Planning and Professional Development for four years, advising students
on r6sum6-drafting. 10 4
99 Email from Susan Chesler, Clinical Professor of Law, Ariz. State Univ., to Heidi K. Brown, Dir. of Legal Writing and Assoc.
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law Sch., Research on Legal Writing Professors as Expert Witnesses (June 7, 2017, 4:41 PM EST)
(copy on file with author).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Tiersma & Solan, supra note 88, at 94.
103 Id. at 94, 97 (referring to the helpfulness of experts in putting a large or complicated "corpus" of text in context, or raising
"to the jury's attention a range of possible interpretations that is available to everyone, but which might have gone
unnoticed").
104 Professor Rebekah Hanley Resume, UNIV. OF OR. SCH. OF LAW, https://law.uoregon.edu/images/uploads/entries/
RHanley resume March 2016 v2.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2018).
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In Deschutes County, Oregon, a concerned party had filed an
anonymous complaint against a circuit-court judge for allegedly misrepre-
senting his qualifications in a 2014 Voters' Pamphlet. The judge had
included five words punctuated by a comma: "Trial Academy, Stanford
Law School." The judge never had matriculated at, nor graduated from,
Stanford. He had attended a weeklong insurance defense training program
on Stanford's campus. 0 5
At first glance, this matter seemed to turn on the grammatical
construction of a single comma. On its face, applying the same principles
as the Lind court did, a federal court (rather than the Oregon Commission
on Judicial Fitness and Disability) might have assessed this dispute as not
worthy of expert testimony. Of course, French writer, Flaubert, perhaps
would object; there is some debate over whether he or Oscar Wilde was
the original source of the quote, "I spent the morning putting in a comma
and the afternoon removing it'1 0 6 Professor Hanley did not prepare a
written expert report, but provided testimony under oath at a judicial-
fitness hearing before the Oregon Commission. This tribunal certainly has
different evidentiary standards than federal courts applying FRE 702 and
Daubert1 0 7 Nonetheless, the result in this case helps distinguish between
basic grammar principles and punctuation in the context of trade usage.
Rather than focusing solely on the grammatical impact of the comma,
Professor Hanley opined about the common practice of r6sum6 writers to
use the comma format in describing educational and professional qualifi-
cations and experience. She indicated that, while the judicial candidate
"could have used greater 'precision;" the reference to Stanford was not
"misleading."' 0 8 Opposing counsel raised no objections regarding her
testimony. The Commission unanimously voted to dismiss the complaint
against the candidate.10 9
Based on the foregoing cases, writing experts should be cautious
about rendering opinions that veer into the judicial lane of determining
contract ambiguity, that state legal conclusions regarding the effect of
105 Scott Hammers, Miller Ethics Complaint Heard, BEND BULL., (Oct. 16, 2015 12:01 AM) http://www.bendbulletin.com/
localstate/3600839-15 1/miller-ethics-complaint-heard.
106 See David Galef, Letter to the Editor, Flaubert's Comma, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 1991) http://www.nytimes.com/
1991/10/20/books/1-flaubert-s-comma-084991.html; https://quoteinvestigator.com/tag/gustave-flaubert/.
107 The Commission applies the following evidentiary standard: "Irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence shall
be excluded. All other evidence of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons in the conduct of their
serious affairs shall be admissible:' OR. COMM'N OF JUDICIAL FITNESS DISABILITY R. P. 13(d), http://www.courts.oregon.gov/
rules/Othero20Rules/CJFDRulesOfProcedure.PDF (last visited Mar. 23, 2018).
108 Hammers, supra note 105.
109 Claire Withycombe, Commission Recommends Dismissal of Complaint Against Deschutes Judge, BEND BULL., (Jan. 7,
2016, 5:53 AM) http://www.bendbulletin.com/localstate/deschutescounty/3884128-151/commission-recommends-
dismissal-of-complaint-against-deschutes-judge.
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written language, or that merely apply fundamental grammar principles,
which actions could be construed in their basic form as infringing on
"institutional roles."110 Instead, a court is more likely to accept the
assistance of a writing expert who can shed light on words, phrases, and
grammatical structures which (1) have particular usage, meaning, or
significance in a trade, business, or profession, (2) fit within the larger
context of a complex document, or (3) are subject to a range of multiple
interpretations which are not necessarily apparent to the trier-of-fact.11
B. Lawyers Engage Writing Experts to Opine on the Substantive
Quality of Writings
Assessing the quality of a piece of writing-perhaps in creative genres
like poetry, literature, or memoir as contrasted with business, legal, or
technical written works-may at first seem like a subjective endeavor. We
might think that the positive attributes of a collection of an author's words
are "in the eye of the beholder." ' 1 2 Yet courts have considered opinion
testimony of experts about the merit or value of writings in both literary
and business scenarios.
Litigants have offered writing experts in cases involving alleged
"obscene" writings. This perhaps would have piqued Flaubert's interest, as
he was the victor in his own 1857 obscenity trial involving Madame
Bovary. For example, in United States v. Whorley,113 the government
charged a defendant with importing "obscene material" when he electron-
ically obtained and transmitted sexually explicit anime cartoons and
emails containing graphic images of children.11 4 To challenge the
government's allegation under 18 U.S.C. 5 1462 (1996) that he had used a
computer to transport "obscene" material, the defendant proffered an
English teacher as an expert witness. The expert planned to render an
opinion regarding "how juvenile sexual content often accompanies the
educational experience of literature and creative writing."11 5 The
government objected to the introduction of any expert testimony
concerning the history of juvenile nudity in art and filed a motion to
exclude the expert's testimony.1 6 In denying the motion, the court cited
FRE 702 and the Daubert standard, noting courts' "wide discretion" to
110 Tiersma & Solan, supra note 88, at 237; Solan, Linguistic Experts, supra note 88, at 90.
111 Solan, Linguistic Experts, supra note 88, at 97.
112 Margaret Wolfe Hungerford, MOLLY BAWN (1878).
113 400 F. Supp. 2d 880 (E.D. Va. 2005).
114 Id. at 881.
115 Id. at 882.
116 Id.
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admit or exclude expert testimony. 17 The Whorley court evaluated how
the expert planned to compare the defendant's electronic correspondence
"with works of literary value such as Lolita, The Color Purple, Tender is the
Night and A Diving Rock on the Hudson"'11 8 focusing on language and
content. In the court's view, the proposed testimony satisfied FRE 702119
by assisting the jury in understanding whether the defendant's emails
"appeal to the prurient interest or lack serious literary value" 12 0-the test
for obscenity under the Supreme Court test in Miller v. California.1 21
Similarly, in a California state case, In re Martinez,1 22 a prison inmate
filed a habeas corpus petition claiming that prison personnel should not
have confiscated a book in his possession on the grounds of obscenity. The
prison officials deemed the book-The Silver Crown, by Mathilde
Madden-to be contraband because it contained explicit sexual content
and potentially could incite violence.1 23 The court described the book as
"involv[ing] werewolves, witches, a ghost, and magic spells. It is 262 pages
long with 44 chapters. There is a fair amount of violence in it, but that is
not dwelt upon and is not shocking or gory."1 24 The court noted that the
book contained "a great number of graphic sexual encounters" between
consenting adults.1 25 The prison's operational procedure banned "obscene
material."1 26 In his habeas petition, the prisoner contended that the book
was no more violent than "recognized great works of literature, such as
Homer's Iliad and Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment."1 27 In support of
his "traverse" (the document filed by the prisoner in response to the
government's opposition to the habeas petition), the prisoner attached a
declaration by a professor of creative writing. The professor rendered an




118 Id. at 884.
119 Id. at 885.
120 Id.
121 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
122 216 Cal. App. 4th 1141 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). Scholars have indicated that California, which had long held out against
adopting Daubert-"waded into the Daubert tide" in 2012 in Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University ofSouthern California, 288
P.3d 1237 (Cal. 2012). See David L. Faigman and Edward J. Irnwinkelried, Wading Into the Daubert Tide: Sargon Enterprises,
Inc. v. University Of Southern California, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1665 (August 2013).
123 216 Cal. App. 4th at 1144.
124 Id. at 1145.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1146.
127 Id. at 1148.
128 Id. at 1149.
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Evaluating whether the book had "literary value;' the court expressly
considered the expert's declaration, first acknowledging the professor's
credentials. He was a creative-writing professor at San Francisco State
University who also taught at other institutions, wrote books, and had
received literary awards. 129 The expert opined,
[T]he book is about more than sex.... [I]t seems to me that the book is
an exploration of the confines of a certain society, one that is in some
ways similar to our own but that also contains magical elements. It's
about freeing oneself from one's greatest fears, and in this way this is
clearly a work of literature. It's not Tolstoy, fine, but this author knows
how to move story, carry out a plot, with a theme, and how to give her
characters a certain depth characteristic of literary fiction. 130
The court pointed out that the prison proffered no opposing expert to
explain that the book lacked "serious literary value."13 1 Nodding to the
prisoner's expert's opinion, the court credited the book's literary devices,
plot, points of view, characters, dialogue, retrospective, and suspense.
1 32
Ultimately, the court held that the book did "not lack serious value and
thus should not have been withheld" by the prison on the basis of
obscenity.1
33
Further, in the business context, in American Association for the
Advancement of Science v. Hearst Corp.,1 34 the publisher of Science
magazine sued the publisher of Science Digest magazine for trademark
infringement after the latter produced a revised edition of its periodical
that resembled its competitor. The court heard evidence and testimony at
a five-day trial.135 In ruling on the trademark-infringement claim and a
motion for a preliminary injunction, the court referenced Science
magazine's expert in the area of science writing who "acknowledged that
the [Science Digest] magazine does contain some articles of good
quality."13
6
Conversely, in Parsi v. Daioleslam, 37 the court rejected an expert
proposed by plaintiffs who were asserting a defamation claim against a
journalist. The proposed expert planned to offer opinions that the jour-
nalist's written work fell below the applicable standard of care for quality.
The expert was an Associate Professor of Journalism and Mass
Communication at the University of North Carolina.1 38 In preparing his
129 Id. at 1161. 134 498 F. Supp. 244 (D.D.C. 1980).
130 Id. at 1161-62. 135 Id. at 247.
131 Id. 136 Id. at 250.
132 Id. 137 852 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 2012).
133 Id. at 1163. 138 Id. at 86.
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expert report which was dubbed "terse" by the court, the professor had
read merely a few English-language articles written by the journalist. He
had examined none of the journalist's articles written in Farsi and had
reviewed no discovery in the case.139 The journalist filed a motion in
limine.
In applying the FRE 702 standard, the court first determined that the
facts and data upon which the expert based his opinions were "patently
insufficient for the task he was given."140 Further, the expert gave vague
responses in his deposition when asked to describe his methodology. He
could not convincingly explain why he chose a one-page 1996 Society of
Professional Journalists' Code of Ethics as the applicable professional
standard.1 41 He failed to explain how he reliably applied any relevant
professional standard to the journalist's writings. In fact, he testified that
he did not systematically check the writer's sources to determine if
assertions in his articles could or could not be substantiated.1 42 He did not
itemize any unfounded facts or deceptive statements in the journalist's
work 1 43 that fell below the alleged standard of care. He could not identify
any of the sources linked in the journalist's online articles that the expert
purportedly had read or tried to verify.144 The court granted the jour-
nalist's motion to exclude the expert from testifying at trial.145
The foregoing cases demonstrate that writing experts analyzing the
quality 46 of a writing should withstand Daubert and FRE 702 scrutiny
when they (1) identify recognized quality criteria within a given writing
genre or industry, (2) provide examples of writing that meets such criteria,
and (3) then use a reliable methodology to compare the written work in
question against the genre or industry standard. In contrast, writing
experts likely will be deemed unhelpful to the trier-of-fact and excluded
139 Id.
140 Id. at 89.
141 Id. at 86, 89.
142 Id. at 90.
143 Id. at 87.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 90.
146 Distinct from analyzing content-focused attributes of a piece of writing like the experts in the foregoing cases, a writing
expert may be retained to provide insights on technical quality, focusing on standards of presentation and professionalism. In
Constant v. Mellon Bank, N.A., No. 02:03CV1706, 2006 WL 1851296 (W.D. Pa. July 3, 2006), a marketing specialist sued her
employer for wrongful termination. A prior year-end evaluation had critiqued her "lack of attention to detail" in written
documents she had produced in her marketing role, and encouraged her to "focus on self-editing and learning to proofread
her own work:' Id. at *3. The employee engaged an adjunct associate professor at a college to render an expert opinion that
the edits and revisions by other personnel to her written work were "arbitrary" and not based on "lack of quality." Id. at *8, n.5.
In a written report, the expert opined that the employee's writing "meets or exceeds the qualifications for a professional
writer's post' Id. The trial court referenced the expert report, yet granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. Id. at
*11.
APPLYING DAUBERT TO FLAUBERT
from testifying at trial if they (1) review an insufficient body of facts or
data relevant to the legal matter, (2) rely upon a flawed or unrecognized
standard or methodology for evaluating writing quality, or (3) apply a
recognized standard or methodology in an unreliable way.
C. Parties Engage Writing Experts to Opine on the Context of
Language in a Writing
Experts also may be retained to provide opinions regarding the
cultural, artistic, or professional context of a written work. For instance, in
United States v. Herron,147 the government charged an aspiring "gangsta
rap" artist with numerous counts of racketeering, conspiracy, and firearms
offenses. The government sought to present evidence at trial in the form
of music videos showing the artist rapping lyrics referring to gangs,
violence, and drug dealing.1 48 The purpose of the government's video
evidence was to prove the existence of the rapper's "criminal enterprise;'
his leadership thereof, his "unlawful possession and use of firearms;' and
related crimes.1 49 In response, the rap artist proffered an expert to testify
about the context of the rap lyrics. Specifically, the expert planned to
render the opinion that, "based on the traditions, patterns, roots, and
antecedents of hip-hop music, including gangsta rap .... song lyrics and
expressions by artists in this medium which are designed to create or
develop their image, and/or promote their work, may not be taken as
expressions of truth by virtue of being stated or sung by the artist."1 5 0 The
government filed a motion to exclude the expert testimony. In evaluating
the motion, the court first described the expert's qualifications:
Dr. Peterson is the Director of Africana Studies and Associate Professor
of English at Lehigh University and holds a Ph.D. in English from the
University of Pennsylvania.... He has written extensively on hip-hop
culture, themes, and narratives, including publications in peer-reviewed
journals and contributions to encyclopedias and anthologies.... He has
appeared as a commentator on these topics on national news media....
He has also conducted interviews of prominent rap artists such as Snoop
Dogg and Nas.15 1
The court acknowledged the expert's specialized knowledge and
corresponding qualifications under FRE 702 "[b]ased on his historical,
ethnographic, and linguistic study of hip-hop'
1 5 2
147 No. 10-CR-0615 (NGG), 2014 WL 1871909 (E.D.N.Y. 150 Id. at *7.
May 8, 2014). 151 Id.
148 Id. at *1. 152 Id.
149 Id.
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In its motion in limine, the government argued that the court should
exclude the expert from trial because his testimony "(1) cannot be the
product of reliable principles or methods, (2) would not be helpful to
jurors, and (3) goes beyond the bounds of proper expert testimony."153 The
court rejected each argument, finding that the expert would provide useful
context for the jury, especially jurors unfamiliar with hip-hop or rap, about
the truthfulness or authenticity of statements made in gangsta rap
lyrics.1 5 4 To protect against the risk of invading the province of the trier-
of-fact, the court indicated that it would limit the scope of the expert's
testimony to "the history, culture, artistic conventions, and commercial
practices of hip-hop or rap music, focusing on gangsta rap. 1 5 5 Regarding
his methodology, the expert could describe and compare examples of
lyrics from the music genre, but he could not "opine on the truth or falsity
of the lyrics or representations in the rap-related videos" or the artist's
other lyrics. He also would not be permitted to decipher those statements
for the jury.1 5 6 The court also invited the government to proffer its own
qualified counter-expert on this subject matter.1 57
The Herron case contrasts with United States v. Wilson,158 in which
the same federal court eight years earlier precluded an expert in the field
of rap culture from testifying that rap lyrics routinely describe violent,
sexual, and other provocative acts not necessarily "rooted in actual
events."15 9 In Wilson, the government charged a defendant with the
murder of two undercover New York Police Department detectives. 1 60
During a search of the defendant's pockets during his arrest, police found
handwritten rap lyrics containing violent references to the act of shooting
individuals in the head. The language alluded to police equipment, such as
protective vests and Glock firearms.1 61 The defendant engaged a professor
of Black American Studies at the University of Delaware1 62 as a testifying
expert to counter the government's contention that the lyrics found in the
defendant's pocket constituted a handwritten confession. While noting
that expert testimony about rap culture has been admitted in copyright
and trademark cases, 163 the court rejected the expert's opinion that the
handwritten lyrics were not a confession.1 64 Regarding methodology, the
153 Id. 162 Id. at 486.
154 Id. 163 Id. at 489-90 (citing BMS Entertainment/Heat Music
155 Id. at *8. LLC v. Bridges, No. 04 Civ. 2584 (PKC), 2005 WL 1593013,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2005) (professor who studies African-
156 Id. American culture and hip-hop music described
157 Id. "call-and-response format" of a song); Boone v. Jackson, No.
03 Civ. 8661 (GBD), 2005 WL 1560511, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y.
July 1, 2005) (experts analyzed lyrics and phrasing in two
159 Id. at 486. songs)).
160 Id. at 485. 164 Id. at 490.
161 Id. at 488-89.
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court emphasized that the expert indicated no intention to compare the
handwritten text to other lyrics in the rap industry.165
In a different vein, in Betker v. City ofMilwauee, 66 a homeowner
offered testimony from an individual with expertise in the methodology of
drafting police affidavits. The homeowner had filed an action against a
police officer for allegedly violating the homeowner's rights in executing a
no-knock search warrant. The homeowner alleged that the written
affidavit supporting the warrant application contained misrepresen-
tations.1 67 At trial, the expert testified regarding the process of writing
affidavits. The jury found in favor of the homeowner. The police officer
filed a motion for a new trial alleging, inter alia, several erroneous
evidentiary rulings including the admissibility of the expert.1 68 In denying
the motion for a new trial on several grounds, the court emphasized the
expert's qualifications: he had served twenty-three years as a police officer,
including seventeen years on the SWAT team; he had served as head of
the Minneapolis Police Academy for four years; he had designed the police
curriculum for the State of Minnesota; he had authored a book on police
ethics; and he had experience writing (and in supervising and educating
others in writing) affidavits and search warrants.1 69 The court held that the
expert's qualifications "were more than sufficient, and his testimony was
reliable and relevant. 1 70
If engaged to provide context about the cultural, artistic, or profes-
sional context of a written work, writing experts should be sure to employ
a sound methodology and describe representative examples of the
particular genre of writing as a benchmark against which to compare the
writing at issue.
D. Litigants Retain Writing Experts to Render Opinions
Regarding Editing Standards and Methodology
Writing experts may be retained to render opinions on the applicable
standards and methodology for editing written works. For example, in
Lish v. Harper's Magazine Foundation1 71 a fiction writer and teacher sued
a magazine for publishing a copyrighted letter he wrote to his creative-
writing students. The magazine cut the letter to half its size without
marking deletions with ellipses.1 72 At trial, each side called experts "to
165 Id. Further, the defendant ignored court rules regarding 169 Id. at 927-28.
expert disclosures. Id. at 489. 170 Id. at 928.
166 22 F. Supp. 3d 915 (E.D. Wis. 2014). 171 807 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), amended as to
167 Id. at 919. damages, No. 91 CIV. 0782 (MEL), 1993 WL 7576 (S.D.N.Y.
168 Id. Jan. 7, 1993).
172 Id. at 1093.
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testify about common practices in the industry with respect to editing,
[the] use of ellipses, and other related topics. 173 First assessing the experts'
qualifications, the court noted that the fiction writer's expert was a
contributing editor to three magazines, an essayist, a creative-writing
teacher, and the author of four books and numerous articles. He
previously had served as a literary editor at other prominent magazines
and as a professor of literature and writing at Harvard.1 74 Likewise, the
magazine's expert was the chief cultural correspondent for the New York
Times, had served as an editor at several magazines, and had written two
books and numerous articles.175 The court allowed the experts to present
competing testimony over whether the magazine's edits had "transformed
the [fiction writer's] Letter from 'a serious and sometimes moving and
impressive piece of work' to a piece that made [the author] look
ridiculous."1 76 The court ultimately held that the publication was not fair
use, and thus the magazine violated the author's copyright.1 77
In the foregoing example, these writing experts provided industry
context that likely was outside the common experience of the average
trier-of-fact: magazine-editing standards, the grammatical role of an
ellipsis in the specific setting of trimming words to fit within a publication,
and the resulting effect on the tone and message of the content.
E. Attorneys Engage Writing Experts to Provide Opinions about
Communication Techniques in a Writing
Litigants also might hire experts to provide opinions as to the clarity
of writings by focusing on the use by authors (intentional or otherwise) of
phrasing that misleads or confuses readers. Distinct from a determination
of whether a document is ambiguous or unclear (which the Lind court
stated was within the court's province), these experts focus on the effect of
the drafter's language choices that potentially confuse a reader. For
example, in a class-action consumer lawsuit against an insurance company
in Iorio v. Allianz Life Insurance Co. of North America,178 consumers
alleged that an insurance company misrepresented information regarding
annuity bonuses in its sales brochures and Statements of Understanding
(SOU). The consumers engaged an expert to testify at a deposition
regarding "the ability of the ordinary reader to understand the policies
based on a review of the written materials alone."179 The expert was a
professor of legal writing and linguistics at the University of Southern
173 Id. at 1095. 177 Id. at 1105.
174 Id. 178 No. 05CV633 JLS (CAB), 2008 WL 8929013 (S.D. Cal.
175 Id. July 8, 2008).
176 Id. at 1096. 179 Id. at *25, n.19.
180 Id.
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California.180 The insurance company filed a motion in limine to exclude
the expert's testimony on the grounds that (1) the jury was capable of
determining whether the insurer's written materials were confusing or
unclear,181 (2) the proposed testimony had "no relationship to the facts of
[the] case" because the consumers did not read the same documents the
expert analyzed, and (3) the expert failed to "employ the academic or intel-
lectual rigor one expects to find in scholarly work" because he did not read
the consumers' deposition transcripts and examined only one of six of the
insurer's brochures and SOUs. 1 82
In their opposition brief, the consumers countered that their
"renowned linguistics expert" was not "being offered to interpret the
terms of the insurance policy-a function which is obviously reserved for
the Court."183 Instead, the consumers propounded the expert's testimony
to highlight the insurance company's purposeful selections of "communi-
cation techniques" and "carefully chosen omissions" intended to deceive
its insureds. 184 In ruling on the motion, the court acknowledged it was
"unclear as to whether there is a discernable line between expert opinion
of 'communicative techniques' and such an opinion invading the province
of the jury, who are 'average readers' themselves. 185 The court granted the
motion, but indicated it would invite an offer of proof at trial and address
then whether to admit the expert testimony. 8 6 Ultimately, the consumers
moved for final approval of a class-action settlement of the case.
For opinions regarding the "comprehensibility" of a writing to survive
FRE 702-Daubert scrutiny, writing experts likely will need to go beyond
stating what the "average reader" could or could not understand.1 87
181 Defendant Allianz Life Insurance Co. of North America's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its
Motion in Limine No. 2 to Exclude Expert Testimony and Evidence from Vincent Gallagher, Edward Finegan, and Frank
Caliri, at 14, available in the docket of lorio, 2008 WL 8929013.
182 Id. at 15-16.
183 Plaintiffs' Opposition Brief to Defendant Allianz Life Insurance Co. of North America's Motion in Limine No. 2 to
Exclude the Expert Testimony of Gallagher, Finnegan, and Caliri, Iorio, No. 305CV00633, 2009 WL 3500950, at *20 (S.D. Cal.
Apr. 30, 2009).
184 Id.
185 Jan. 27, 2010 Order at 15, available in the docket of lorio, 2008 WL 8929013.
186 Id. at 16. In a New York state class-action lawsuit, Michels v. Phoenix Home Life Mutual Insurance Co., No. 95/5318, 1997
WL 1161145, at '22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 7, 1997), class members objected to a Class Notice as "confusing, misleading, vague, or
missing certain necessary details:' The court rejected the objections, stating, "[t]he notice clearly sets forth in plain English
all information necessary to inform Class Members of their options' Id. The court noted that "a number of experts in legal
writing and dispute resolution have provided the Court with favorable analyses regarding the clarity of the notice" citing two
affidavits submitted in briefs in support of the approval of the class action settlement. Id. Notably, however, New York state
courts apply the Frye standard. See In re New York City Asbestos Litigation, 148 A.D.3d 233, 241 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (Kahn,
J., concurring) ("New York has consistently resisted adopting the Daubert standard').
187 Professors Tiersma and Solan state that, for example, "the admissibility of linguistic expert testimony on the comprehen-
sibility of jury instructions is uncertain at best: Tiersma & Solan, supra note 88, at 227.
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Instead, they should focus on how the use of particular words, grammar,
and syntax affect a reader's understanding.
F. Parties Have Engaged Writing Experts to Opine on the
Propriety of White-Paper-Drafting Methodology
Litigants also may engage experts to render opinions on the integrity
of the analytical methodology used in documents like "white papers"
written by stakeholders in a particular industry, such as the pharma-
ceutical field. In In re PrografAntitrust Litigation,1 88 a drug manufacturer
filed a citizen petition with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
challenging the approval process of a generic alternative drug for organ
transplant patients. Purchasers of the generic drug countered that the
drug manufacturer's FDA petition was a sham designed solely to
perpetuate the manufacturer's monopoly and interfere with the business
interests of a generic drug competitor.189 In support of the petition, the
manufacturer had submitted white papers addressing the generic substi-
tution of drugs designed for transplant patients, recommending
"bioequivalence testing."190 In response to the manufacturer's motion for
summary judgment, the purchasers attacked the "reliability and credi-
bility" of the manufacturer's analysis, citing expert testimony that the
"white papers contained no scientific or medical data, but were instead
premised on theoretical and unsupported physician concerns."1 91 The
court found material facts in dispute and denied the drug manufacturer's
motion for summary judgment.1 92
In contrast, in Rheinfrank v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 193 a consumer
filed a products-liability action against a drug manufacturer, alleging that
her baby had suffered injuries from an anti-epileptic drug the mother had
ingested during pregnancy. Before promoting the sale of a new drug,
manufacturers must submit a New Drug Application to the FDA proving
that the medication is "efficacious."1 94 The manufacturer had submitted
letters to the FDA, with accompanying white papers.1 95 The consumer
argued that the drug company had "submitted misleading or incomplete
information" in its correspondence with the FDA.1 96 The consumer
proffered testimony of four experts who reviewed and opined on the
allegedly deceptive information contained in the white papers. The parties
188 No. 1:11-MD-02242-RWZ, 2014 WL 4745954 (D. Mass. 193 119 F. Supp. 3d 749 (S.D. Ohio 2015), reconsideration
June 10, 2014). denied by 137 F. Supp. 3d 1035 (S.D. Ohio 2015), aff'd 680 F.
189 Id. at *1, *7. App'x 369 (6th Cir. 2017).
190 Id. at *8. 194 119 F. Supp. 3d at 762.
191 Id. 195 Id. at 763, 764.
192 Id. at *11. 196 Id. at 767.
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submitted numerous Daubert cross-motions seeking to exclude or limit
expert testimony and also filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
In determining whether to admit the consumers' experts' opinions at
trial, the court decided that "an expert's opinion that the FDA would have
reacted differently if the submissions to the FDA ... had been supported
by different evidence is speculative."197 The court concluded that
"[t]estimony about what [the drug company] could have and should have
researched or stated to the FDA in its applications is speculative." '1 98 The
court ultimately granted the manufacturer's motion for summary
judgment, in part, on the consumers' claims of design defect, negligent
misrepresentation, fraud, and unjust enrichment.1 99
The lesson from the foregoing cases is that the Rheinfrank experts
went too far in trying to link the flawed methodology in the white papers'
drafting process to the FDA's ultimate decision, which the court deemed
speculative. The Prograf experts appeared to stick with attacking the white
papers' drafting methodology, relaying that this genre of writing requires
reliance on scientific or medical data, but the documents in question were
merely "theoretical" and lacked substantiated support. While lawyers
deposing or cross-examining an expert might try to push the witness to
speculate, smart experts in this context will limit themselves to evaluating
the methodology within the four corners of the document, and whether it
is sound or flawed.
G. Litigants Retain Writing Experts to Compare Two Texts
Finally, litigants may engage experts to compare two separate
writings, such as patent applications, copyrighted music, or screenplays.
In a 1924 patent-infringement case, Rip Van Winkle Wall Bed Co. v.
Murphy Wall Bed Co.200 (a case which obviously pre-dates FRE 702 and
Daubert by several decades), an expert submitted an affidavit in support of
a preliminary injunction describing his expertise in evaluating
descriptions and disclosures in patent applications.20 1 The lower court
considered this expert's opinions and those of a competing expert who had
twenty-five years of expertise in preparing and prosecuting patent appli-
cations, writing descriptions, and rendering opinions on patent matters.20 2
Both experts analyzed the language and text of the descriptions and
disclosures of types of beds in two separate patent applications. The lower
court considered the experts' affidavits, in addition to exhibits and
197 Id. at 768. 200 1 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1924).
198 Id. 201 Id. at 674.
199 Id. at 792. 202 Id.
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models, and conducted a full hearing before concluding that the defendant
had infringed upon the plaintiff's patent. 20 3 The appellate court likewise
relied upon the opinion of the plaintiff's expert about the description and
disclosure of the beds in the two patent documents, yet reversed the lower
court's finding of patent infringement. 21
Similarly, in MCA, Inc. v. Wilson,205 in a non-jury trial, the court
admitted the testimony of opposing music plagiarism experts in a
copyright infringement case relating to songs. The plaintiff's expert, who
had twenty-six years of experience studying music plagiarism, presented
comparison charts to highlight commonalities and similarities between
the two songs in question. The court indicated it was "impressed to an
exceptional degree" by the expert's methodology and presentation, refer-
encing the "excellent charts '20 6 linking the chord structure, harmony,
rhythm, succession of notes, and lyrics of the two songs. 20 7
In contrast, in Durkin V. Plat, 20 8 screenwriters filed an action against
authors of an unpublished manuscript, seeking a declaratory judgment
that the screenwriters owned the copyright in their work. The manuscript
authors proffered an English professor at Clemson University as an expert
to testify that the screenwriters "did not add any significant or original
material in preparing the screenplay and are not entitled to any copyright
interest in the screenplay as a derivative work. 20 9 The methodology of the
proposed expert's opinion testimony was to compare the screenplay to the
manuscript. He planned to discern whether the screenwriters added
original material to the manuscript that was significant and, therefore
copyrightable. The screenwriters filed a motion to exclude such expert
testimony on the grounds that the expert was "not qualified, he base[d] his
opinion on unreliable methodology, and his proffered testimony [was]
irrelevant. '210  Regarding the expert's qualifications, the court
acknowledged that the witness was (1) an English professor at Clemson
University specializing in rhetoric, linguistics, and literature; (2) the
founder and CEO of a scholarly publishing company; and (3) the author of
"articles and books about the nature and teaching of writing and literature,
the state of publishing, research methodology and ethics, film and literary
analysis, copyright and plagiarism, and the adaptation of literary works
into film '. 211
203 Id. at 675. 208 920 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Ga. 2013).
204 Id. at 678-79. 209 Id. at 1326.
205 425 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 210 Id.
206 Id. at 449. 211 Id. at 1330.
207 Id. at 449-50.
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The court first determined that, while the expert was qualified to
opine about plagiarism, he was unqualified to render opinions about
copyright law. 212 The court next concluded that the expert's proposed
testimony failed both the reliability and relevance elements of the standard
for admissibility. In comparing the screenplay and the manuscript, he used
the wrong legal standard under the Copyright Act.213 Further, his
testimony was irrelevant because (1) he reached conclusions not in
dispute, opining that the screenplay was not copyrightable as an original
work when the parties were debating its protection as a derivative work,
and (2) his opinions addressed pure issues of law. 214 Pointing out that that
the manuscript authors' opposition brief was "essentially an essay on
Daubert that does not relate the law to the specifics of this case" 215 the
court granted the motion to exclude the expert.216
The key takeaway from the foregoing expert's missteps, which
resembled the journalism expert's fumblings in Parsi,217 is for a writing
expert to first identify the proper industry or legal standard against which
to evaluate the written work, and then to apply such standard in a reliable
manner. Further, when appropriate and relevant, writing experts might
consider using charts or other visual aids, particularly when analyzing
excerpts of a particular lengthy "corpus" of work, as Professor Solan
describes, 218 or when comparing passages from more than one document.
III. A Legal Writing Expert's FRE 702-Daubert
Framework for Success
In many cases, litigants use writing experts in a variety of pretrial
capacities (i.e., affidavits, expert reports, depositions) without these
witnesses' necessarily needing to "go the distance" and testify at trial.
Nonetheless, writing experts, particularly legal writing experts here, are
wise to keep FRE 702 and the Daubert factors in mind from the onset of
their retention as expert witnesses. Being mindful of the FRE
702-Daubert standards, starting from the initial task of analyzing the
212 Id.
213 Id. at 1331-32.
214 Id. at 1332.
215 Id. at 1330, n.12.
216 Id. at 1333.
217 Parsi, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 86, 89 (the journalism expert could not convincingly explain why he chose a one-page 1996
Society of Professional Journalists' Code of Ethics as the applicable professional standard in analyzing another journalist's
body of work).
218 Solan, Linguistic Experts, supra note 88, at 88.
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client's facts and legal issues, and continuing throughout the process of
drafting FRCP 26(a)(2)(B) reports, and while testifying in depositions,219
will help ensure admissibility of such opinion testimony at trial if ulti-
mately needed. The following sections provide guidance as to how legal
writing experts engaged to analyze the substantive or technical integrity of
a document can satisfy the FRE 702-Daubert criteria, through employing
the concrete and reliable legal writing standards and analytical method-
ologies that are well established in legal academia and law practice. 220
A. Qualifications of a Legal Writing Expert
The threshold step in every FRE 702-Daubert analysis is to establish
the proposed witness's qualifications as an expert, focusing on the indi-
vidual's relevant "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.2 21
For a legal writing expert, this likely will include a law degree, plus some
combination of these: summer law-clerk work; judicial-clerkship expe-
rience; years in law practice researching, writing, and editing legal
documents; membership in a local, state, or federal bar; authorship of legal
scholarship; presentations at legal writing conferences; membership in
legal writing organizations such as the Legal Writing Institute, the
Association of Legal Writing Directors, SCRIBES: The American Society
of Legal Writers, or the Association of American Law Schools' Section on
Legal Writing, Reasoning, and Research; membership in bar associations;
and years of experience teaching legal writing. FRCP 26(a)(2)(B) specif-
ically requires an expert's written report to describe "the witness's
qualifications, including a list of all publications authored in the previous
10 years' 222 The expert also must identify "all other cases in which, during
the previous 4 years, the witness testified as an expert at trial or by depo-
sition' 223 Notably, a court will not deem an expert witness unqualified
219 Dr. Terri LeClercq, a legal writing scholar and language expert with a Ph.D. in English and who taught for twenty-three
years at the University of Texas School of Law, reports that, over her many years of experience serving as a legal writing
expert, "[o]nce the opposing side has taken my deposition, generally they do not fight my appearance [at trial]:' Email from
Dr. Terri LeClercq, President and Consultant, Legal Editor's Ink, to Heidi K. Brown, Dir. of Legal Writing and Assoc.
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law Sch., Expert witness (June 21, 2017, 9:02 AM EST) (copy on file with author).
220 The application of legal writing standards may arise in unexpected scenarios. Idaho Senator James Risch complimented
former FBI Director James Comey on the quality of the written memorandum he submitted prior to his testimony before the
Senate Intelligence Committee on June 8, 2017, stating, "I find it clear. I find it concise, uh, and having been a prosecutor for
a number of years and handling hundreds, maybe thousands of cases and read police reports, investigative reports, this is as
good as it gets:' See C-SPAN, Risch & Comey on Legal Writing, https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4673000/risch-comey-legal-
writing (last visited Apr. 16, 2018).
221 FED. R. EvID. 702.
222 FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(iv).
223 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(v).
224 See, e.g., Brand v. Comcast Corp., 302 F.R.D. 201, 209 (N.D. Ill. 2014); New York v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 15-CV-
1136 (KBF), 2016 WL 4735368, at 13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2016); Ford v. County of Hudson, No. 07-5002 (KM)(MCA), 2014
WL 2039987, at '15 (D.N.J. May 16, 2014).
LEGAL COMMUNICATION & RHETORIC JALWD / VOLUME 15 / 2018
contained in a form agreement, especially if it is a precedent agreement,
may play into the stock story of the form agreement. These recitals
represent an ideal opportunity to draw from narratology.82 The recitals
can illustrate the points of view of the transacting parties. Despite
presenting an ideal opportunity to draw from narrative, recitals often
provide little to no background. This is, in part, because the recitals in
form documents are generic or often nonexistent. Yet the drafter as story-
teller may effectively use recitals to consciously reframe the narrative by
acknowledging the parties' true intent behind the agreement, thus
replacing the stock story. Recitals can effectively be used to present the
parties' specific intentions and to provide relevant and individualized
background information. 83 The information in the recitals may be useful
to explain the parties' contractual relationship, any past history, and the
parties' intentions that may present an alteration of the generic stock story
provided by the form language. Recognizing the transactional lawyer's role
as storyteller can be particularly valuable in encouraging the tailoring of
the recitals to the specific story of the transaction.
Additionally, the use of definitions enables the drafter to tailor the
meanings of certain terms used in the contract to the subject trans-
action.84 Generally, if the word or phrase as used in the contract is
intended to vary in any way from the standard dictionary definition of that
word or phrase, or if the word or phrase does not have a standard
dictionary definition, it should be defined within the contract. Definitions
can also be drafted to customize the meaning of words or phrases used; in
other words, they can be used to supplement or alter the stock story.
For example, consider the definition of the terms "child;' "children;'
and "issue" in a form Will.
As used in this instrument, the term "child" or "issue" means the blood
descendants of any individual; provided, however, that an adopted child
and such child's issue, whether natural or adopted, shall be considered as
issue of an individual. A child born out of wedlock shall [not] be included
in the term issue.85
The standard definition will correspond with the intent of a number
of people who create a will. But the standard definition may not reflect the
82 Chesler & Sneddon, Once Upon a Transaction, supra note 43, at 273-74.
83 Chesler, Effective Contract Drafting, supra note 66, at 35.
84 Id.
85 MARY E RADFORD, 2 REDFEARN: WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA § 17:40, 238 (7th ed. 2008).
86 See generally Susan N. Gary, Definitions of Children and Descendants: Construing and Drafting Wills and Trust
Documents, 5 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 283 (2013).
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counsel for being over-qualified for the particular task at hand. Dr. Terri
LeClercq, a legal writing scholar and language expert with a Ph.D. in
English and who taught for 23 years at the University of Texas School of
Law, indicates that "[o]pposing attorneys attack [her] Ph.D. in English and
say [she is] not qualified to be a 'common reader and interpreter."' 231
B. Reliability of the Opinions and Methodology of Legal Writing
Experts
The reliability prong is the next component of the FRE 702-Daubert
analysis. FRCP 26(a)(2)(B) requires experts to describe in their written
reports (1) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express
and the basis and reasons therefore, and (2) the facts or data considered by
the expert in forming such opinions. Legal writing experts should bear in
mind FRE 702 subsections (b), (c), and (d) when drafting the statements of
opinions in their FRCP 26 reports. They must describe the underlying
facts and data reviewed and lay the foundation for the reliability of their
methodology.
1. FRE 702(b): Review of Sufficient Facts or Data
FRE 702(b) requires that expert testimony be "based on sufficient
facts or data:" Thus, to avoid being excluded from trial on a motion in
limine (or embattled during cross-examination), legal writing experts first
should ensure that they have reviewed "sufficient facts or data" from the
client's case.232 One court indicated that "the term 'data' encompasses the
reliable opinions of other experts."233 Litigation teams often select and
prepare packets of case materials and send them to their experts for
review. If experts feel they need additional material to conduct a
"sufficient" review, they should request counsel to supply supplemental
documentation or access to client personnel or witnesses.
Notably, a 2010 amendment to FRCP 26 changed the requirement
that testifying experts must produce "data and other information 23 4 and
helpful to the trier-of-fact and excluded the witnesses from testifying at trial. See also State v. Hilburn, 625 So. 2d 235, 237
(La. Ct. App. 1993). The defendant, appealing a murder conviction, proffered an expert witness in "writing patterns;' with
twenty years of experience grading junior-high and high-school essays, to opine that a "neatly folded[,] typed suicide letter"
in the victim's lap was indeed a suicide note. In excluding the witness, the court emphasized that the witness, whose essay-
grading career had concluded eight years earlier, had written no articles on writing-pattern analysis, could name no authors
thereof, and was unaware of any such authors.
231 Email from Dr. Terri LeClercq, President and Consultant, Legal Editor's Ink, to Heidi K. Brown, Dir. of Legal Writing and
Assoc. Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law Sch., Expert witness (June 21, 2017, 9:02 AM EST) (copy on file with author).
232 See, e.g., Parsi, 852 F Supp. 2d at 89 (the facts and data the expert relied upon were "patently insufficient"); see also
United States v. Mamah, 332 E3d 475 (7th Cir. 2003); Newkirk v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1016-18 (E.D.
Wash. 2010).
233 McLean v. Air Methods Corp., Inc., No. 1:12-CV-241-JGM, 2014 WL 280343, at *2 (D. Vt. Jan. 24, 2014).
234 FED. R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee's notes to 2010 amendment (emphasis added).
APPLYING DAUBERT TO FLAUBERT
instead limits disclosure to "facts or data considered by the witness in
forming" the expert opinions. Under the prior rule, litigants argued for the
production of draft expert reports and information that could reveal
attorney work product: "theories or mental impressions of counsel."235
Now, draft expert reports are protected from discovery.
2. FRE 702(c): Reliability of the Principles and Methods Employed
FRE 702(c) requires that an expert's testimony be "the product of
reliable principles and methods:" The non-exclusive Daubert factors
provide guidance on how to evaluate reliability: (1) whether the expert's
theory or technique has been tested, (2) whether the theory or technique
has been subjected to peer review and publication, (3) the technique's
"known or potential rate of error," and "the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling the technique's operation;' and (4) the degree of
acceptance of the theory or technique within the scientific community.
These factors certainly can be applied to theories, principles, and tech-
niques used by experts in evaluating written expression and the
substantive or technical quality of a piece of writing. Indeed, in providing
opinions regarding the quality of a document that contains legal and
factual analysis, or the integrity of the drafting, editing, and finalizing
process, legal writing experts can implement the standards that have been
developed, vetted, tested, applied, and widely (if not universally) accepted
within legal academia and law practice. These principles are "grounded in
an accepted body of learning or experience" in the legal writing academy
and field. 236
Legal writing scholars consistently write about the methodology of
written legal analysis in which writers use logic formulas to (1) state the
legal issues in question, (2) identify the elements or factors of the relevant
legal rule(s), (3) synthesize rules or sub-rules from multiple sources of law,
(4) illustrate such rules through carefully selected precedent on point, (5)
apply the rule components to the facts of the client's case, and (6) predict
an outcome (in a piece of objective legal writing) or assert a reasoned
position (in a persuasive legal document). Legal writing scholars further
emphasize that, to be credible and valuable to a reader, a written legal
235 FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4), advisory committee's notes to 2010 amendment ("Rule 26(b)(4) is amended to provide work-
product protection against discovery regarding draft expert disclosures or reports and-with three specific
exceptions -communications between expert witnesses and counsel'). The exceptions include (i) information about
compensation for the expert's study or testimony, (ii) facts or data that the party's attorney provided and that the expert
considered in forming the opinions to be expressed, and (iii) assumptions that the party's attorney provided and that the
expert relied on in forming the opinions to be expressed. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C); see also Durney & Fitzpatrick, supra note
38, at 20; Warshauer & Warshauer, supra note 7, at 16 (draft expert reports are not discoverable); Battista et al., supra note 38,
at 33-35.
236 FED. R. EVID. 702, advisory committee's notes to 2000 amendment.
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analysis must be based on reliable legal-research methodology. The author
must find and sift through statutes, regulations, or cases in the appropriate
jurisdiction, assess their hierarchical authority, synthesize rules from these
multiple sources, and ultimately provide the reader with the requisite
information to discern whether the legal rules constitute mandatory or
merely persuasive authority. A written analysis also must contain an
appropriately thorough and ethical rendition of the pertinent facts bearing
on the legal analysis. Beyond substance and depth, additional technical
standards include proper citation to the factual record and the sources of
law, in compliance with the legal-citation rules adopted in the governing
jurisdiction. These typically include The Bluebook: A Uniform System of
Citation or local-court style manuals. 23 7 Legal writing standards obviously
also include adherence to sound principles of English grammar and punc-
tuation. Using the Daubert vernacular, the tenets and techniques that legal
writing experts use to create and evaluate written legal analyses have been
tested, subjected to peer review, distilled into standards, and broadly
accepted across the legal writing community. Legal writing professors and
practitioners who are engaged as expert witnesses for the first time might
call upon some of the sources cited below as references for these widely
recognized benchmarks. 23 8
Law professors Cathy Glaser, Jethro Lieberman, Robert A. Ruescher,
and Lynn Boepple Su, in their book, The Lawyer's Craft,239 define legal
analysis as "a highly structured approach for making predictions about
how courts will likely resolve legal questions."240 While these professors
characterize the thinking part of legal analysis as "an art, not a scientific or
mathematical method;' contending that "[t]he answer to a legal question is
rarely definitive" 241 this does not mean a written legal analysis cannot be
subjected to Daubert-worthy reliability standards. Indeed, FRE 702 and
Kumho Tire confirm that expert testimony can be based on "scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge:" Further, even if some scholars
might argue that the process of researching, theorizing about, and crafting
solutions to a legal conundrum is more artistic than scientific, the act of
writing a cogent and well-reasoned legal analysis solidifies the legal
237 See, e.g., NEW YORK LAW REPORTS STYLE MANUAL, https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/files/2017-SM.pdf.
238 Just as Professors Tiersma and Solan note that "[1]inguistics is a robust field that relies on peer-reviewed journals for
dissemination of new work" and "the [linguistics] expert has available a number of well-accepted instruments and a great
deal of learning on which to base an analysis" so do legal writing experts-as evidenced by the multitude of legal writing
resources cited herein. Tiersma & Solan, supra note 88, at 225.
239 CATHY GLASER ET AL., THE LAWYER'S CRAFT: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL ANALYSIS, WRITING, RESEARCH, AND
ADVOCACY (2002).
240 Id. at 8.
241 Id. at 15.
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writer's creativity, intellectual processing, and trial-and-error into a
structural framework analogous to a mathematical proof. In fact,
Professor Robin Wellford Slocum, in her book, Legal Reasoning, Writing,
and Persuasive Argument, compares written legal analysis to "a mathe-
matical equation" that "logically build[s] ' 242
Professor Glaser and her coauthors use mathematical terminology-
the concept of a "legal proof"-to describe how legal writers present
logical legal analyses in writing.243 Legal writers "identify the issue;' "state
the applicable rule;' "validate [the] rule by citing and discussing the 'rule
cases;" "apply the rule to the facts of [the] case;' "validate [the] application
by showing that [the client's] case is analogous to the rule cases whose
holdings match the predicted holding of [the client's] case, and distin-
guishable from the rule cases whose holdings do not match [the] predicted
holding;' and state the conclusion. 244 These authors describe this type of
written legal reasoning as a "deductive syllogism '. 245
Professors Christine Coughlin, Joan Malmud Rocklin, and Sandy
Patrick, coauthors of A Lawyer Writes: A Practical Guide to Legal
Analysis, 246 corroborate that "[o]ver time, attorneys have established a
common preference for how a legal argument is presented '247 in writing.
They reiterate that a clear written legal analysis states the legal issue,
explains the law, applies the law to the client's facts, and asserts a
conclusion. 248 These authors emphasize that, while law professors
teaching novice legal writers may use different acronyms or mnemonics to
visually frame a written legal analysis, each system follows the same logic
flow: e.g., IRAC (Issue, Rule, Application, Conclusion); CREAC
(Conclusion, Rule, Explanation of Rule, Application, Conclusion);
CRRPAP (Conclusion, Rule, Rule Proof, Application, Prediction). 249
Within this logic structure, lawyers regularly employ alternative methods
of reasoning: rule-based reasoning (applying a checklist of elements or a
collection of factors from a legal rule to client facts);25 0 analogical
reasoning (engaging with the principle of stare decisis, comparing and
242 ROBIN WELLFORD SLOCUM, LEGAL REASONING, WRITING, AND PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT, 113 (2d ed. 2006).
243 GLASER ET AL., supra 239, at 64.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 CHRISTINE COUGHLIN ET AL., A LAWYER WRITES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEGAL ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2013).
247 Id. at 81.
248 Id.; see also LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS, 91 (3d ed. 2011) (explaining the basic paradigm of
legal analysis).
249 COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 246, at 82-83.
250 Id. at 131.
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contrasting precedent with the client's facts); 251 integrating rule-based and
analogical reasoning;25 2 and incorporating public-policy considerations. 2 3
Of course, these authors affirm that "effective editing and polishing
distinguish the professional from the unprofessional" 25 4
Professor Charles R. Calleros, in his book, Legal Method and
Writing,255 likewise characterizes the IRAC formula as a method of
deductive legal reasoning that "provides at least a rough organizational
framework for most legal analyses in office memoranda, answers to essay
examinations, and briefs. '25 6 Of course, after many years of experience
drafting memoranda, briefs, mediation papers, etc., in law practice, expert
legal writers might no longer consciously think in (or use the parlance of)
IRAC terminology. However, Professor Calleros highlights the structural
framework's usefulness in training novice legal writers to craft logical and
thorough analyses. 25 7 Consistent with other legal writing scholars,
Professor Calleros emphasizes that the legal writer's responsibility is to
identify legal issues in play,25 8 extract a legal rule from applicable sources
of law (based on considerations of primary and secondary authority, juris-
diction, and weight of authority), 25 9 apply the rule components to the
client's facts, 260 and state a conclusion. 261 He describes how legal writers
often shift from deductive reasoning to inductive reasoning, comparing
and contrasting case law to the client's facts "to reach a conclusion about
either (1) the outcome of another specific case (analogical reasoning), or
(2) the likelihood of the truth of a general proposition. '262 Professor
Calleros indicates that, in addition to considering the most logical ways to
organize multiple issues or sub-issues, 263 expert legal writers value
clarity,264 scope and depth of analysis, 265 and attentive revision. 266
Standards of "effective legal writing" mandate that writers properly cite to
authority,267 disclose directly adverse authority,268 and refrain from
advancing disingenuous positions.269 Professor Calleros summarizes solid
251 Id. at 135.
252 Id. at 147.
253 Id. at 173; see also EDWARDS, supra, note 248, at 55-62.
254 COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 246, at 247.
255 CHARLES R. CALLEROS, LEGAL METHOD AND
WRITING (6th ed. 2011).
256 Id. at 82; see also SLOCUM, supra note 242, at 112
(explaining the "deductive analytical pattern" used by legal
writers).
257 CALLEROS, at 83; see also id. at 219 (referencing various
acronyms used in teaching legal writing methodology:
IRAC, CRAC, CREAC, or CRuPAC).
258 Id. at 84.
259 Id. at 90-94.
260 Id. at 101.
261 Id. at 104.
262 Id. at 142.
263 Id. at 242.
264 Id. at 268.
265 Id. at 294.
266 Id. at 301.
267 Id. at 305.
268 Id. at 346.
269 Id. at 347.
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written advocacy as reflecting "sound analysis, sensible organization, and
effective writing style."27
0
The writing methodology espoused by Professor Laurel Currie Oates
and Professor Anne Enquist in their book, Just Memos 271 reflects
consistent principles. These scholars describe the benchmark of a
predictive written analysis as a "well-organized, easy-to-read, concise
document."272 In step with other analysts of legal writing standards,
Professors Oates and Enquist describe how legal writers must "set out the
applicable tests, rules, or definitions and then apply them to the facts of
[the] client's case.' 273 These authors explain that, when reading a legal
memorandum, attorneys anticipate seeing "the applicable rules, examples
of how those rules have been applied in analogous cases, each side's
arguments, and a conclusion. In addition, the attorney expects to see each
of those types of information in specific places."274 Professors Oates and
Enquist reiterate that "[t]hese expectations are not born of whim. Instead,
they reflect the way United States attorneys think about legal questions 275
These scholars indicate that expert legal writers must exercise
judgment about "what are the legally significant facts;' "what statute(s) or
common law doctrine will govern;' "which cases are the key analogous
cases;' "which arguments the court will find persuasive;' and "how the case
will turn out."276 Authors of an objective written legal analysis must
"present the facts accurately and objectively"; they must "not set out legal
conclusions, misstate facts, leave out facts that are legally significant, or
present the facts so that they favor one side over the other' 277 Legal writers
must "cite authority to support each of the points" made to "show that [the
writer has] the support of the law, other courts, and other legal minds ' 278
Regarding proofreading and professionalism, Professors Oates and
Enquist attest that even "small errors can have serious consequences" and
"can make the difference between [a] client winning and losing, between
competent lawyering and malpractice."' 279 Finally, they describe how the
editing process must focus on "sentence structure, conciseness, precision,
grammar, and punctuation. 280
By further example, The Handbookfor the New Legal Writer, authored
by Professors Jill Barton and Rachel H. Smith,281 states that documents
270 Id. at 379. 276 Id. at 10.
271 LAUREL CURRIE OATES & ANNE ENQUIST, JUST 277 Id. at 160.
MEMOS (2d ed. 2007). 278 Id. at 11.
272 Id. at 9. 279 Id. at 272.
273 Id. at 215. 280 Id. at 282.
274 Id. at 175. 281 JILL BARTON & RACHEL H. SMITH, THE HANDBOOK
275 Id. at 176. FOR THE NEW LEGAL WRITER (2014).
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providing objective legal analysis are "expected to accurately advise the
reader" and "must be scrupulous, balanced, and reliable."282 Persuasive
legal analyses likewise "must be logical, credible, and compelling" 283 "Both
types of documents require a careful legal analysis. 284 Professors Barton
and Smith advise that legal documents should be
organized using a format known as "CREAC" ... which requires the
writer to identify and fully explain the relevant legal authorities before
applying those authorities to the facts from the legal question. After
doing so, the writer walks the reader through the law and analysis so that
the reader understands the logical progression of the writer's thinking.
CREAC thus helps guarantee that the writer's legal analysis is sound and
meticulously supported. 2
85
These scholars reiterate that "CREAC is the preferred structure for
most analytical legal documents, including memos, motions, briefs, and
judicial opinions. Judges, lawyers, and legal writing professors all expect
these documents to follow the CREAC format. ' 286 As a starting point,
"[e]very legal analysis depends on legal research. Before a memo, motion,
brief, letter, email, or judicial opinion containing legal analysis can be
prepared, [the writer] must first conduct accurate and thorough legal
research."287As part of a reasoned legal analysis, legal writers must identify
the applicable legal rule(s), either with "legally significant terms that need
to be defined and interpreted;' or with a checklist of elements that must be
satisfied, or factors that the trier-of-fact must weigh or balance.
288
Additionally, legal writers must properly cite to the factual record and
legal authority, or they risk undercutting the efficacy and integrity of the
written document 28 9 and its underlying research.29' Regarding writing
style, "complicated legal doctrine is best explained and understood when
presented in plain language."2
91
Additionally, Professor Richard K. Neumann, Jr., author of Legal
Reasoning and Legal Writing: Structure, Strategy, and Style,292 advocates
the foregoing logic formula to support legal conclusions. 293 Professor
282 Id. at 3. 291 Id. at 91.
283 Id. at 4. 292 RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND
284 Id. LEGAL WRITING: STRUCTURE, STRATEGY, AND STYLE (6th
ed. 2009).
285 Id. at 27 (acknowledging other acronyms in footnote 1). 293 Id. at 93-94 (referencing the acronyms of CRAC and
286 Id. CRuPAC); see also KAMELA BRIDGES & WAYNE SCHIESS,
287 Id. at 263. WRITING FOR LITIGATION, 99-100 (2011) (describing the
288 Id. at 42-43. "organizational structure typically used for legal analysis");
HELENE S. SHAPO ET AL., WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE
289 Id. at 45. LAW, 135, n.1 (6th ed. 2013) (referencing IRAC, TRAC,
290 Id. at 281. CRAC, and CREAC organizational methods).
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Neumann further substantiates the importance of proper citation of
authority; "[b]ad citation form, on the other hand, is instantly noticed and
causes the reader to suspect that the writer is sloppy and therefore unre-
liable' 2
94
Legal writing professors and practitioners engaged as expert
witnesses for the first time can look to numerous additional scholarly
resources, including a plethora of other legal writing books, plus articles in
peer-edited academic journals and publications such as The Journal of the
Legal Writing Institute, Legal Communication & Rhetoric: Journal of the
Association of Legal Writing Directors, The Scribes Journal of Legal
Writing, The Second Draft, and Perspectives. These sources describe
standards of legal writing methodology in concordant terms. Further,
these principles and frameworks routinely are discussed and analyzed by
legal writing professors and practitioners at local, regional, national, and
international conferences.
Additionally, courts consistently hold briefs submitted by counsel to
corresponding legal writing quality standards. Judges often take the time
to explain in written judicial opinions how lawyers have either failed to
meet such benchmarks, or how, by satisfying such quality criteria, brief-
writers enabled the court to adjudicate a case efficiently and soundly.2 95 In
these written opinions, courts commend analytical logic, language clarity,
reliable research, proper citation to the factual record and applicable law,
adherence to court procedural and technical formatting rules, plus proof-
reading, grammar, spelling, punctuation, and professionalism.
The foregoing scholarly and practice-oriented sources demonstrate
that the principles and techniques of written legal analysis have been
tested, subjected to peer review, distilled into standards, and broadly
accepted within the legal writing community. Accordingly, a legal writing
expert who relies on such methodologies in analyzing the substantive or
technical quality of a piece of written legal analysis should withstand
scrutiny under FRE 702(c) and the Daubert reliability factors.
294 NEUMANN, supra note 292, at 239; see also BRIDGES AND SCHIESS, supra note 293, at 103 ("Both the substance and the
form of your legal citations affect your credibility with the judge .... Incorrect citation can hurt your credibility").
295 For more information about courts' admonitions of lawyers who submit briefs that fall short ofjudges' expectations
regarding quality legal writing (and appreciation of lawyers who do submit quality briefs), see Heidi K. Brown, Breaking Bad
Briefs, 41 J. LEGAL. PROF. 259 (Spring 2017); Heidi K. Brown, Converting Benchslaps to Backslaps: Instilling Professional
Accountability in New Legal Writers by Teaching and Reinforcing Context, 11 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 109
(2014).
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3. FRE 702(d): Reliability of the Application of the Principles and
Methodology to the Client's Facts
A legal writing expert also must satisfy subsection (d) of FRE 702 and
reliably apply the pertinent principles and evaluative methods to the facts
of the client's case. To do so, legal writing professors and practitioners
serving as expert witnesses should consider conveying the extent of their
personal experience in having applied the methodologies described above.
The typical 1L legal writing professor teaches an average of 37.5 legal
writing students per semester, according to a survey conducted by the
Association of Legal Writing Directors (ALWD) and the Legal Writing
Institute (LWI) in 2015.296 Many first-semester IL legal writing curricula
require students to write a draft of a closed-research memorandum and
then meet with the legal writing professor one-on-one to discuss the
teacher's critique of and feedback on the draft.297 Students then submit a
revised memorandum for a grade. In most legal writing programs,
students repeat this process for an open-research memorandum
assignment in the fall semester.298 They then replicate the same process
twice more in the spring semester when transitioning to persuasive legal
writing. Students write drafts of two briefs, conference with their
professors on both drafts, revise the drafts, and then submit the briefs for
a grade. Thus, in each academic year, using the foregoing data and
assignment progression, the typical legal writing professor applies his or
her legal writing methodology-assessing and measuring the quality and
integrity of a written legal analysis-a total of approximately 300 times: 8
papers per student (4 drafts and 4 revisions) for approximately 37.5
students. The 2015 ALWD-LWI survey reports that the typical legal
writing professor reads an average of 1,540 pages of student work per
term, and spends an average of 47.5 hours per semester in conferences
with students evaluating written work.299 Their analytical methodology is
296 ASS'N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS & LEGAL WRITING INST., REPORT OF THE ANNUAL LEGAL WRITING SURVEY 83
(2015), http://www.alwd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/2015-survey.pdf [hereinafter 2015 ALWD-LW I Survey]. The 2015
survey had 194 respondents. A 2017 survey report updated the institutional data based on 182 responses to a subsequent
2016-2017 survey; data based on individual professor responses to the 2016-2017 survey has not yet been evaluated. In the
2017 report, 59 respondents reported teaching a mean of 37.5 students. See ASS'N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS & LEGAL
WRITING INST., REPORT OF THE ANNUAL LEGAL WRITING SURVEY 90 (2017), https://www.lwionline.org/sites/
default/files/Report20ofo2Otheo202016-2017oo2OSurvey.pdf [hereinafter 2017 ALWD-LW I Survey].
297 In the 2015 ALWD-LW I Survey, with regard to professors' individual process of evaluating students' written work, 192
respondents reported providing "comments written on the paper itself and in the margins.' Id. at 17. Further, 149 provide a
"general feedback memo addressed to all students;' 134 give a "feedback memo written specifically for the individual student;'
175 write "short comments ... at the end of the paper," 186 deliver "comments in person during [the] conference;' and 149
provide "grading grids or score sheets:' Id. at 17.
298 In the 2015 ALWD-LWI Survey, 154 respondents reported using "a combination of closed and open library research
assignments" in the 1L program. Id. at 12.
299 Id. at 83.
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applied across a wide range of skill sets and writing competency levels.
Most professors also must numerically quantify the evaluative results to
distinguish each student's paper from his or her fellow classmates' work,
and eventually assign individual grades in compliance with the institution's
mandate for assessments and grading distribution. 00 Of course, many
legal writing professors also teach upper-level writing courses where they
employ similar evaluative methodologies. 0 1
Lawyers engaged to serve as expert witnesses can lay a similar foun-
dation for describing their individual professional experience applying
reliable legal writing methodology to different genres of written legal
work. While this might seem like a time-consuming endeavor, practi-
tioners serving as expert witnesses might provide context for the reliability
of their evaluative methodologies by going back through their timesheets
for a reasonable time period, and quantifying (if possible) the number of
legal memoranda, motions, briefs, mediation papers, and other written
legal analyses they have written, reviewed, edited, finalized, and
submitted.
Overall, to withstand FRE 702-Daubert scrutiny as to the reliability of
their application of particular methodologies, experts first can explain that
the above-referenced analytical methodologies have been tested by
professors and practitioners who have distilled the process of written legal
analysis into the formulas and guidelines appearing in countless scholarly
and practice-based works. Expert legal writers vet these methodologies in
the classroom and law office in large volume every academic and billable
year. After laying that foundation, experts then can describe how they
applied the same methodology to the particular document or set of
documents involved in the client's litigation.
C. Relevance of the Legal Writing Expert's Opinions
Circling back to the remaining component of FRE 702-subsection
(a)-to be admissible at trial, the legal writing expert's specialized
knowledge must "help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue:" In formulating written opinions and testimony
that will assist the trier-of-fact, the expert should resist inching into the
300 Id. at 10. In the 2015 ALWD-LWI Survey, 178 respondents reported that the 1L course grade is included in the students'
GPAs. Only five respondents reported grading on an "honors, pass, fail" basis, and three reported grading on a "purely
pass/fail" basis. In the 2017 ALWD-LWI Survey, 164 respondents reported that the predictive legal writing course grade is
included in the students' GPA, and 152 respondents reported that the persuasive legal writing course grade is included in the
students' GPA. Id. at 30.
301 2015 ALWD-LWI Survey at 24, 27; 2017 ALWD-LWI Survey, supra note 296, at 53.
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territory of rendering opinions on issues of law, asserting legal
conclusions, or discussing the legal implications of evidence.
This restraint could present a challenge for some experts, either by
virtue of the craftiness of opposing counsel or sheer human nature. Dr.
LeClercq shared that, in her experience in depositions, once opposing
counsel realizes they are not making headway in attacking her qualifi-
cations, "they spend hours attempting to get [her] to make a legal
conclusion." '2 She cautions that "[s] ometimes they are successful and my
attorney is horrified and I am mortified."3 3 Legal writing experts should
remain alert to subtle yet persistent attempts by opposing counsel to
elevate an expert witness to the role of trier-of-fact through the conversa-
tional give-and-take of deposition questioning and the natural instinct for
cooperative smart individuals to share what they know and think.30 4 Many
an expert has gotten caught in the trap of straying beyond the scope of the
opinions rendered in their carefully crafted expert reports, much to the
chagrin of the lawyer defending the deposition. 05 Experts swept up in the
enthusiasm of answering a deposing attorney's series of questions, who
opine on issues outside the bounds of their expert engagement, also run
the risk of contradicting the opinions of other experts retained by the
client. Legal writing experts must exercise vigilance, be intimately familiar
with the breadth and limits of the four corners of their expert reports, and
resist the ego's desire or the helpful teacher's instinct to expound further.
The FRE 702(a) relevance prong also tests whether the expert offers
insights "beyond the general experience and common understanding of
laypersons."30 6 As the Lind and Sand cases indicated, some courts have
considered basic grammatical principles to fall within the common under-
standing of the trier-of-fact, while others have permitted grammar
expertise. 0 7 In today's arena of casual written communications peppered
302 Email from Dr. Terri LeClercq, President and Consultant, Legal Editor's Ink, to Heidi K. Brown, Dir. of Legal Writing and
Assoc. Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law Sch., Expert witness (June 21, 2017, 9:02 AM EST) (copy on file with author).
303 Id.
304 In an International Association of Defense Counsel webinar, the attorney- presenter advised: "play off of the expert's
confidence and teaching instincts to elicit as much substantive testimony as possible:' John T. Lay, Deposing Your Opponent's
Expert 21 (International Association of Defense Counsel, Mar. 19, 2014 Webinar), http://www.iadclaw.org/assets/1/7/
Deposing Your Opponents Expert Presentation.pdf.
305 One article noted,
As soon as an expert witness starts testifying to matters outside the scope of the question asked or the matter at
hand, he or she is in dangerous waters, and risks making statements that would be to the detriment of your
client's interest in the case. The importance of keeping statements within the scope of testimony must be
stressed to the expert witness.
Megjabeen Rahman, 15 Attorneys Share Their Expert Witness Horror Stories, THE EXPERT INSTITUTE, Jan. 11, 2016,
https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/15-attorneys-share-their-expert-witness-horror-stories/.
306 Disalvatore, 2016 WL 3951426, at *9.
307 2014 WL 4187128; 2010 WL 69359.
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with emojis instead of words, normalization of "covfefe" Tweets, 0 8 and the
troubling abandonment of apostrophes by many users of electronic
communications, courts may someday routinely recognize grammar
expertise as "specialized knowledge" which satisfies the standards for
admissibility of expert testimony at trial. But in the near future, to defini-
tively satisfy the FRE 702(a) relevance prong, legal writing experts should
endeavor to go beyond basic principles of grammar construction to
provide helpful guidance to a trier-of-fact, for example, in how grammar
constructs play a role in documents within certain trades or industries, or
how grammatical choices open up a document to different interpre-
tations. 0 9 Indeed, legal writing experts engaged to analyze written works
who use the methodologies accepted in the legal writing community and
described above likely offer insights "beyond the general experience and
common understanding of laypersons;' thereby satisfying FRE 702(a).
IV. Conclusion
On writing, Flaubert encouraged assiduous care: "Whatever the thing
you wish to say, there is but one word to express it, but one verb to give it
movement, but one adjective to qualify it; you must seek until you find
this noun, this verb, this adjective:" Legal writers who, based on their
knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education, pay similar heed to
precise and thoughtful selection of concepts, sources, language,
vocabulary, and punctuation in the process of drafting, editing, and
revising a written work are particularly well-suited to serve as expert
witnesses. Armed with greater awareness of the FRE 702 and Daubert
criteria from the outset of a lawyer-expert relationship, experts and the
lawyers310 who engage them can be better prepared to ensure admissibility
of helpful expert testimony. Employing the reliable methodologies that
have been tested, subjected to peer review, distilled into standards, and
broadly accepted within the legal writing community, these experts can
withstand FRE 702-Daubert scrutiny and provide helpful services to
triers-of-fact, positively impacting the administration of justice.
308 Matt Flegenheimer, What's a "Covfefe'? Trump Tweet Unites a Bewildered Nation, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/us/politics/covfefe-trump-twitter.html.
309 Solan, Linguistic Experts, supra note 88, at 97.
310 See, e.g., Warshauer & Warshauer, supra note 7, at 20 (A trial lawyer's "task is to educate [experts] about the admissibility
requirements and to prepare them to testify about their opinions. Litigation can be a lion's den for expert witnesses unfa-
miliar with the process. Don't send them out alone; prepare and protect them each step of the way"); see also Solan, Legal
Systems, supra note 88, at 1193 (acknowledging that, in many cases in which courts have rejected linguistic expert testimony,
"the problem appears to lie in the fact that lawyers at times ask linguists to do too much"); Solan, Linguistic Experts, supra
note 88, at 102 ("Lawyers who ask linguists to testify must recognize just what it is that linguists do, and structure their
requests accordingly. Linguists can help in this process by enquiring into the legal issues, and pointing out just when their
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